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I. Executive summary 
What is the aim of this paper? 
1. This paper provides a literature review and critical analysis on the following 
aspects of non-economic losses of climate change: the conceptual background 
including how non-economic losses contribute to loss and damage and the total 
cost of climate change; the main types of non-economic losses that might occur 
and the ways in which they may materialize; various assessment techniques 
available to estimate non-economic losses, both generically and through concrete 
examples of current practice; and implications of the different assessment 
techniques for the identification of non-economic risks and the design of practical 
adaptation actions to manage them. Consistent with the UNFCCC work 
programme on loss and damage, the main focus of this technical paper is on 
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change. 
What are non-economic losses and why are they important? 
2. Climate change will affect a wide range of social, economic and 
environmental systems. It has become common to split these impacts into non-
economic losses and economic losses. Economic losses can be understood as the 
loss of resources, goods and services that are commonly traded in markets. As 
such, economic losses should be recorded by and manifest in the system of 
national accounts (although they may not be in countries with large informal 
economies). Market prices can be used to value economic losses.  
3. Non-economic losses can be understood as the remainder of items that are 
not economic items; that is to say that non-economic items are those that are not 
commonly traded in markets. The absence of a market price is one of the main 
reasons why assessing non-economic losses is challenging. However, their effect 
on human welfare is no less important.  
4. In many developing countries, non-economic losses may well be more 
significant than economic losses. Recognizing and managing the risk of non-
economic loss should therefore be a central aspect of climate change policy.  
How do non-economic losses contribute to total climate costs? 
5. The total costs of climate change consist of the following elements: 
(a) Mitigation costs: the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
limit the extent of climate change; 
(b) Adaptation costs: the cost of dealing with the consequences of 
unavoidable climate change; 
(c) Loss and damage: the residual costs, which cannot be avoided 
through adaptation and mitigation and which can be further split into: 
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(i) Economic loss;  
(ii) Non-economic loss. 
6. Non-economic losses are therefore one of four cost elements that 
constitute the total cost of climate change. There is a link between the magnitude 
of adaptation cost, mitigation cost and loss and damage. Increasing the mitigation 
effort (higher mitigation costs) will reduce loss and damage and might make 
adaptation cheaper. For example, greater mitigation should result in a smaller 
increase in sea levels and so less protection from sea level rise will be required. 
Increasing the amount of adaptation (higher adaptation cost) will also reduce loss 
and damage. For example, changing agricultural practices to suit the change in 
climate will cause less disruption than a failed crop. 
What are the main types of non-economic losses? 
7. Non-economic losses occur in three distinct areas: private individuals, 
society and the environment. More specifically, non-economic losses can be 
understood as losses of, inter alia, life, health, displacement and human mobility, 
territory, cultural heritage, indigenous/local knowledge, biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. 
8. Non-economic losses may occur through many channels. They may be 
related to both slow onset impacts (e.g. the loss of territory to sea level rise) and 
extreme events (e.g. loss of life in a cyclone) associated with climate change. The 
loss may be directly linked to adverse climate change impacts (e.g. loss of 
ecosystems) or occur indirectly (e.g. malnutrition as a consequence of impacts in 
the agriculture sector). 
9. The distinction between non-economic loss and economic loss will 
sometimes be blurred. For example, damage to natural ecosystems is primarily a 
non-economic loss, since ecosystem services are rarely traded on the market. 
However, there may be market impacts if one of the services the ecosystem 
provides is food or fibre, the provision of which is part of the market economy.  
Can non-economic losses be valued? 
10. While valuation in common parlance is associated with money and 
therefore economic methods, a broader interpretation of the act of valuation is 
simply to “compare the relative merits of actions or objects”. There is a lot of 
experience worldwide with the assessment and valuation of non-economic 
impacts of human development and natural phenomena in this way. 
11. This technical paper identifies four broad categories of valuation technique: 
economic valuation, multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA), composite risk indices 
and qualitative/semi-quantitative methods. All of them have been used in a 
climate change context. 
12. The aim of economic valuation is to express non-economic impacts in 
monetary terms, rendering them comparable to economic impacts and costs. The 
 5 
main methods of non-market valuation are (a) revealed preference methods, 
which observe what people do (e.g. the money spent on visiting cultural sites) and 
(b) stated preference methods, which elicit valuations from surveys. Sometimes it 
is possible to derive values from existing studies, obviating the need for bespoke 
new analysis. This method is called benefits transfer. 
13. MCDA, composite risk indices and qualitative /semi-quantitative 
approaches do not seek to put money values on non-economic losses. MCDA and 
composite risk indices use formal scoring and weighting to the same end. 
Qualitative/semi-quantitative methods do not attempt to aggregate to the same 
extent, so it is up to the users of the analysis to compare and evaluate the many 
effects of policy choices.  
14. Whatever method is chosen, the assessment and valuation of non-
economic impacts remains very difficult, due to the many uncertainties involved, 
as well as the essential role of value judgements. These difficulties are usually 
magnified where analytical capacity is limited. 
15. Owing to this complexity, it is very difficult to express aggregate damage in 
a single number of “total non-economic loss”. Economic valuation techniques 
have been applied to the problem, and there are indicative monetary estimates 
from integrated assessment models, but a detailed quantification of non-
economic loss is more likely to rely on a number of different metrics, such as 
disability adjusted life-years (DALYs) in the case of health impacts. 
How can decision makers take into account non-economic losses? 
16. The assessment of non-economic losses is not the first time that 
policymakers have confronted the question of how to take into account the non-
economic effects of human development and natural phenomena. Experience has 
accumulated over several decades and in many countries of the assessment of the 
environmental and social impacts (usually alongside the economic impacts) of 
new economic development, of existing economic activity and of natural 
environmental phenomena. 
17. Many frameworks have been developed for these purposes, including 
environmental impact assessment (EIA), strategic environmental assessment 
(SEA), environmental risk assessment, cost–benefit analysis (CBA), wealth/capital 
accounting, vulnerability assessment, disaster loss/damage assessment and 
climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessment (CCIAV). 
18. All these frameworks have their advantages and disadvantages. Their 
suitability depends on institutional contexts as well as the problem at hand. What 
they have in common is that they offer well-established toolkits and a rich body of 
experience in accounting for non-economic factors in economic and social 
decision-making.  
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What are the challenges for policymakers when managing the risk of non-economic 
loss? 
19. Managing potential non-economic losses from climate change combines 
two sets of challenges that policymakers may already be familiar with. The first 
challenge is the identification and quantification of non-economic value and its 
inclusion in decision-making, using the techniques introduced above. 
Incorporating non-economic values into economic decision-making would go a 
long way to ensure non-economic systems are robust and healthy. 
20. However, using these techniques as a matter of course requires 
institutional adjustments and a change in appraisal mentality. Monitoring, 
assessing and managing non-economic impact has to become standard practice, 
in the way financial and economic appraisal already are. 
21. The second challenge is adaptation to climate change more broadly. Many 
of the issues faced by the adaptation community are the same whether the aim is 
to prevent economic loss or non-economic loss. Making good adaptation 
decisions will reduce the risk of economic and non-economic losses alike, as the 
two are often linked. For example, flood protection will help to avoid loss related 
to production interruptions (an economic loss) as well as distress and the 
outbreak of disease (a non-economic loss). 
22. The literature on good adaption decisions stresses two immediate issues. 
The first is to set adaptation priorities for the immediate future, with a focus on 
win–win measures that yield immediate benefits (e.g. flood protection, 
environmental protection) and measures that affect the long-term vulnerability 
profile of countries (e.g. planning and infrastructure decisions). 
23. The second immediate adaptation issue is to remove barriers to effective 
adaptation by both public and private decisions makers. It is important to 
recognize the practical limits to adaptation. Problems may be institutional, policy-
related, market-related, cognitive or related to insufficient funding, information 
and skills. The way non-economic impacts are treated – measured, valued and 
assessed – in adaptation decision-making is one such barrier. The general barriers 
to adaptation may also be stronger for non-economic losses than for economic 
losses as institutions, policymakers and markets tend to be less aware of non-
economic losses. 
II. Background 
24. The UNFCCC work programme on loss and damage was established at COP 
16 in order to “consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with 
climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change” (decision 1/CP.16). The work programme is 
part of the broader Cancun Adaptation Framework, which aims to enhance action 
on adaptation, reduce vulnerability and build resilience in developing countries. 
25. At COP 18, Parties requested the “preparation of a technical paper on non-
economic losses” (decision 3/CP.18, para. 10) as part of the work programme on 
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loss and damage. This report provides background material to the secretariat for 
the preparation of that paper. The aim of both the background report and the 
technical paper is to: 
(a) Analyse the range of non-economic losses associated with climate 
change impacts and how they fit within the concept of total climate change costs; 
(b) Assess methodologies to value/assess the impacts of climate change 
that are considered non-economic and examine the application of these 
assessment methods for adaptation planning and practices; 
(c) Identify challenges, gaps and priorities to advance the understanding 
of and action to address non-economic losses. 
26. The background report is structured as follows: 
(a) Chapter III below provides conceptual background on non-economic 
loss, including how non-economic losses contribute to loss and damage and the 
total cost of climate change; 
(b) Chapter IV below describes the main types of non-economic losses 
that might occur and explores the ways in which they may materialize; 
(c) Chapter V below discusses various assessment techniques available 
to estimate non-economic losses, both generically and through concrete examples 
of current practice; 
(d) Chapter VI below discusses what the different assessment techniques 
imply for the identification of non-economic risks and the design of practical 
adaptation actions. 
27. Consistent with the work programme on loss and damage, the main focus 
of the paper is on developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change. 
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III. Non-economic losses in the context of climate change 
An explanation of terms 
1. Loss and damage 
28. Loss and damage describes the impact associated with the adverse effects 
of climate change. These adverse effects include those related to extreme events 
and slow onset events such as sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean 
acidification, glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest 
degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification.1 There is no clear distinction 
between losses and damages in either the literature or under the Convention 
                                                          
 
1
 Decision 1/CP16 paragraph 25. 
Box 1 
Summary of non-economic losses 
- Non-economic losses are one of four cost elements that constitute the total cost of 
climate change. The total costs of climate change consist of mitigation costs (the cost 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions), adaptation costs (the cost of dealing with the 
consequences of unavoidable climate change) and loss and damage (the residual 
costs, which cannot be avoided through adaptation and mitigation), which can be 
further split into economic loss and non-economic loss.  
 
- There is a link between the magnitude of mitigation cost, adaptation cost and loss 
and damage. Increasing the mitigation effort (higher mitigation costs) will reduce 
loss and damage and might make adaptation cheaper. Increasing the amount of 
adaptation (higher adaptation cost) will also reduce loss and damage. 
 
- It has become common to split impacts of climate change into non-economic losses 
and economic losses. Economic losses can be understood as the loss of resources, 
goods and services that are commonly traded in markets. Market prices can be used 
to value economic losses. 
 
- Non-economic losses can be understood as the remainder of items that are not 
economic items; that is to say that non-economic items are those that are not 
commonly traded in markets. The absence of a market price is one of the main 
reasons why assessing non-economic losses is challenging. 
 
- In many developing countries, non-economic losses may well be more significant 
than economic losses and in some cases may be irreversible, such as the loss of 
cultural items or territory. Recognizing and managing the risk of non-economic loss 
should therefore be a central aspect of climate change policy. 
 
- This technical paper is informed by our current understanding of loss and damage. 
This understanding is in turn limited to our knowledge of past events and what 
models tell us about future impacts of climate change. Thus, there may be additional 
non-economic losses which are not considered here due to conceptual, knowledge 
and data gaps. 
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(although see UNFCCC, 2012), and the two terms are treated as largely 
synonymous in this technical paper. 
29. The impact of climate change that is of ultimate concern is not these 
physical effects, but the impact they have on people. Human systems are 
vulnerable to the physical impacts of the climate; loss and damage is a function of 
the physical impacts and the degree of vulnerability to these impacts 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012, chapter 1, page 32). 
Therefore, to understand loss and damage it is essential to understand the 
magnitude of physical impacts, the degree to which human systems are 
vulnerable to impacts and the way in which individuals and society value the 
impacts that they are vulnerable to. These together determine the magnitude of 
loss and damage arising from a given physical impact. 
30. Figure 1 shows how climate change may increase the severity of climate-
related loss and damage, represented by the dashed and dotted line. It also shows 
how adaptation, while reducing loss and damage (going from the dashed and 
dotted line to the solid line), also imposes costs, which means that the net cost, 
the dashed line, is higher than residual climate change damage but lower than 
climate change damage without adaptation. Stabilizing at a given global mean 
temperature will also entail mitigation costs. 
Figure 1 
Adaptation reduces gross damages, leaving residual damages,  
but adds to the costs of adaptation 
 
Source:  Adapted from Stern (2007).  
31. An important simplification in figure 1 is that it does not consider 
uncertainty; that is, the wide range of possible climate damages that may occur 
for a given global mean temperature. It is important to understand that, for any 
given climate, there is a risk of a range of levels of loss and damage occurring and 
Cost of climate 
change without 
adaptation
Cost of adaptation 
plus residual climate 
change damage
Residual climate 
change damage
Net benefit of 
adaptation
Total cost of 
climate change, 
after adaptation
Gross benefit 
of adaptation
Global mean temperature
Cost of 
climate 
change
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that this range is large. Assessments of loss and damage must account for this fact 
if they are to be adequate. 
32. People are exposed to climate risk even without climate change, that is to 
say that there is always a probability distribution over the range of possible levels 
of climate damage that climate events can cause due to uncertainty in forecasting 
regardless of whether the climate is changing. This uncertainty, also known as 
climate variability, means that individuals and society do not face just one 
scenario of loss and damage but instead loss and damage should be understood 
as having a range of possible magnitudes, each with an associated, although often 
unknown, chance of occurring. In figure 2 the range of possible climate damages 
without climate change is represented by the dotted and dashed probability 
distribution. 
33. Climate change exposes individuals and society to a different, most often 
higher, profile of risk, or probability distribution, of loss and damage. The 
potential risks of climate change are represented by the dotted probability 
distribution in figure 2 This profile can be reduced by mitigation as this reduces 
the magnitude of climate change relative to ‘business as usual’ (dashed curve). 
The profile of risks can be further reduced by adaptation, which reduces 
vulnerability to climate damages (solid curve). Note that the figure abstracts from 
the possibility that both climate change and climate policy may alter not just the 
position, but also the shape of, the probability distribution. 
34. The remaining difference in the profile of risks between a situation with ‘no 
climate change’ (dotted and dashed curve) and a situation with ‘climate change, 
plus mitigation and adaptation’ (solid curve), is the risk of loss and damage 
attributable to climate change. Individuals and society face two effects from the 
change in profile of risks due to climate change. First, there may be an increase in 
the risk of high loss and damage as climate change may result in an increase in 
high damage events, for example through adverse slow onset events or an 
increase in the frequency and/or intensity of extreme events. This is the dashed 
area between the solid curve and the dotted and dashed curve. There may also be 
a decrease in the risk of low loss and damage as climate change may result in 
fewer low damage climate events. This is the diagonally shaded area between the 
solid curve and the dotted and dashed curve. The diamond-hashed area, where 
the solid curve and the dotted and dashed curve overlap, describes the risk of 
climate damages that does not change between the situations of ‘no climate 
change’ and ‘climate change, plus mitigation and adaptation’. The net change in 
the risk of loss and damage between situations will vary across regions and time. 
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Figure 2 
Climate change affects the profile of risk of climate damage, which can in turn be changed 
through mitigation and adaptation, with loss and damage as the residual change in risk 
 
 
Note: The shapes of the probability distributions are for illustration only. The change in distribution due to 
climate change, mitigation and adaptation is not limited to, or necessarily, a shift in the whole distribution. For 
more information on the possible changes in climate-related probability distributions see Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (2012, figure SPM.3).  
 
2. The total cost of climate change 
35. Loss and damage is not the only cost associated with climate change. Costs 
are also incurred in reducing the potential damages from climate change through 
mitigation and adaptation; that is, in figure 2, in moving from the dotted 
probability distribution to the dashed and then to the solid probability 
distribution. 
36. As figure 3 shows, the total costs of climate change are therefore equal to 
the cost of mitigation, plus the cost of adaptation, plus the risk of loss and 
damage attributable to climate change. The different cost components are 
unlikely to accrue equally across countries or people. Countries particularly 
vulnerable to climate change, for example, will face a disproportionate share of 
loss and damage, while Parties included in Annex I to the Convention are currently 
expected to shoulder most of the mitigation burden. 
37. There is a link between the magnitude of adaptation cost, mitigation cost 
and residual loss and damage. Increasing the mitigation effort (higher mitigation 
costs) will reduce loss and damage and might make adaptation cheaper. 
Increasing the amount of adaptation (higher adaptation cost) will also reduce 
residual loss and damage. By choosing the right combination of mitigation and 
adaptation it may therefore be possible to reduce not just loss and damage, but 
also the total cost of climate change, although cost minimization will not be the 
only objective when determining mitigation and adaptation effort. 
Probability
Probability distribution of 
damage from the climate 
without climate change
High total damageLow total damage
with climate change
plus mitigation
plus adaptation
increase, 
attributable to 
climate change, in 
risk of high loss 
and damage
12 
 
Figure 3 
Non-economic losses are a subset of the risk of loss and damage, which is part of  
the total costs of climate change 
 
Note: The shapes of the probability distributions are for illustration only. 
38. It has become customary to divide loss and damage further into a non-
economic (or non-market) component and an economic (or market) component. 
Table 1 gives some examples of non-economic and economic loss and damage. 
However, the distinction is somewhat arbitrary and in practice the share of 
damage of each type is unknown. But adopting this distinction, the total cost of 
climate change can then be further split into the following components (shown in 
figure 3): 
(a) Mitigation costs; 
(b) Adaptation costs; 
(c) Loss and damage: 
(i) Economic loss; 
(ii) Non-economic loss. 
39. The focus of this technical paper is on non-economic losses, which are a 
subset of the residual loss and damage attributable to climate change. Loss and 
damage due to climate change in turn is a subset of the total costs of climate 
change. In many developing countries, non-economic losses may well be more 
significant than economic losses, and perhaps the most significant aspect of 
climate change. 
Probability
shift towards greater probability of 
high loss and damage
mitigation
adaptation
cost of mitigation
cost of adaptation
Total costs of 
climate change
=
+
+
net risk of loss and 
damage attributable 
to climate change
High total
damage
Low total
damage
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Table 1 
Examples of economic and non-economic loss and damage 
Economic losses Non-economic losses 
Loss of wages Loss of life 
Loss of crops Reduction in biodiversity 
Reduction in tourism revenue Destruction of items of cultural significance 
Loss of economic revenue from coastal 
activity due to inundation 
Loss of sovereignty due to inundation 
 
3. Non-economic losses 
40. Non-economic losses are best understood in relation to economic losses. 
Economic losses can be understood as the loss of resources, goods and services 
that are commonly traded in markets. As such, economic losses will be recorded 
by and manifest in the system of national accounts (although not for economic 
losses that are borne in the informal economy); that is to say that economic losses 
can affect gross domestic product. Market prices can be used to value economic 
losses.  
41. Non-economic losses can be understood as the remainder of items that are 
not economic items; that is to say that non-economic items are those that are not 
commonly traded in markets. The absence of a market price is one of the main 
reasons why assessing non-economic loss and damage is challenging, but their 
effect on human welfare is no less important. 
42. Non-economic losses can also be given a substantive, although incomplete, 
description. Non-economic losses can be understood as losses of or related to, 
among other things, life, health, displacement and human mobility, territory, 
biodiversity, ecosystem services, cultural heritage, indigenous/local knowledge 
and other social capital. These are explained in more detail in chapter IV below. 
However, it should be recognized that this is not a complete list of non-economic 
losses. 
43. Furthermore, items can have both economic and non-economic value, and 
so their destruction can lead to both economic and non-economic losses. For 
example, the salinization of agricultural land can cause a loss of crops, which have 
an economic value, and also the loss of indigenous knowledge connected with 
stewardship of that land, which is a non-economic loss. This technical paper, 
focusing on non-economic losses, does not consider coincident economic losses. 
However, when non-economic losses can lead to economic losses this will be 
noted in chapter IV below, for example loss of biodiversity could lead to lower 
tourism revenues. 
44. Non-economic losses, like economic losses, can be direct or indirect. Direct 
losses are those that are immediately attributable to a climate event. For 
example, loss of health or life due to an extreme weather event is a direct non-
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economic loss. Indirect losses are those resulting from changes in the system in 
response to a climate event. For example, a decrease in health due to 
malnutrition that is the result of higher food prices and food shortages is an 
indirect non-economic loss. 
45. In summary: 
(a) Losses can be categorized as non-economic or economic, where non-
economic losses tend to be losses of items that are not often traded in markets. 
These items can have both economic and non-economic value and so there can be 
multiple types of losses from a destructive event; 
(b) Losses can have spillover effects, which result in further losses, 
sometimes of a different type; 
(c) Losses can be classified by their relation to a destructive event; that is 
to say the loss can be a direct or an indirect result of a destructive event. 
Valuation, measurement and comparability of non-economic losses 
46. As explained in chapter III.1 above, the impact of climate change that is of 
ultimate concern is the effect of physical impacts on individuals and society, 
rather than the physical impacts themselves. People are at the centre of any 
consideration of non-economic losses. So the way in which individuals and society 
perceive and value impacts must be understood. This first requires an 
understanding of what is valued and how, or if, value can be measured. If there 
are multiple sources of value a further issue, of comparability, must be explored. 
This issue is concerned with the possibility of aggregating and/or making trade-
offs between different sources of value. These issues are now briefly explored. 
47. Humans have many systems of value. These systems define valuable 
objectives that humans strive to achieve. There are three common frameworks 
for describing such systems: 
(a) Welfare: in this utilitarian framework maximizing welfare is the 
objective. Welfare is achieved through the consumption and experience of both 
tangible and non-tangible items. An important notion in this framework is that 
items can often be substituted for each other; for example, a loss in biodiversity 
can be made good by an increase in material consumption and as a result all value 
can be monetized. The concept of welfare is most useful when applied to 
economic sectors, as the value of trade-offs is determined by common consensus 
through prices; 
(b) Well-being: in this framework, articulated in Sen (1999), well-being 
comes from a number of sources and cannot be achieved unless objectives in 
each of the determinants of well-being are achieved. A simple example is that 
without good health material wealth is unlikely to be fulfilling. There is no 
definitive description of the determinants of well-being, but the framework is 
broadly accepted and has influenced important programmes such as the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index and the 
Millennium Development Goals; 
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(c) Ethical frameworks: ethical objectives can be distinct from objectives 
that directly better humanity. For example, preserving other species may not be 
detrimental to welfare or well-being but it could be an ethical imperative. Rights-
based ethical frameworks are also distinct from welfare and well-being 
frameworks as under a rights-based framework the betterment of humanity is 
achieved by observing rights, such as the right to life, rather than through any 
means possible. Welfare and well-being frameworks are also ethical, but they are 
also anthropocentric and have at least some concept of permissible substitution 
between items of value. Ethical frameworks are different because they need not 
centre on human needs and place firm boundaries on acceptable actions; for 
example, rights to life and freedom from hunger cannot be transgressed or must 
be positively supported at the expense of other actions. 
48. These systems of value describe what is valued. Within these systems, 
items of value can also be described in terms of how they are valued. The 
following distinction is often made: 
(a) Use value: an item can be valuable if it is used in a process that 
achieves a valuable objective. Items can have direct and indirect use values; for 
example, food is directly useful in maintaining health while trees are indirectly 
useful in maintaining health by, for example, reducing air pollution. Option value 
describes the difference in use value that an item may have in the future 
compared with the present; 
(b) Non-use value: an item has non-use value if knowledge about it, 
rather than use of it, increases welfare or well-being. Bequest and existence value 
are important non-use values. Value arises because preserving an item for future 
or current generations can provide a sense of satisfaction. 
49. Use and non-use value can be considered as the two parts of the total 
economic value, which is the sum of all the ways in which an item can be valued, 
as illustrated in figure 4. The concept is called total economic value, even though 
it deals with items that have non-economic value, because all items of non-
economic value in the framework are monetized, using techniques described in 
chapter V.B below. That is to say that in an assessment of the total economic 
value all non-economic items are given an economic valuation. This concept is 
used in assessments of the value of ecosystems, such as the Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), a major global initiative to develop and use 
systems of measurement for ecosystems and biodiversity. 
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Figure 4 
Total economic value describes the sum of ways in which items can be valued, although 
methods of indirect economic valuation must be applied to non-economic items  
if they are to be added together in practice 
 
Note: Examples of each type of value are given in the dashed boxes. 
Source: Adapted from TEEB (2010a). 
50. A distinction can also be made between intrinsic and instrumental value. An 
item with intrinsic value is valuable simply because it is what it is. For example, a 
Total Economic Value
Use values Non-use 
values
Actual 
value
Option 
value
Indirect 
use
Direct 
use
Consumptive Non 
consumptive
Philanthropic 
value
Altruism to 
biodiversity
Existence 
value
Altruist 
value
Bequest 
value
Crops, 
livestock, 
fisheries, 
wild foods, 
aquaculture
Recreation, 
spiritual/
cultural well-
being, 
research, 
education
Pest control, pollination, 
water regulation and 
purification, soil fertility
Future use of known and 
unknown benefits
Satisfaction 
of knowing 
that future 
generations 
will have 
access to 
nature’s 
benefits
Satisfaction 
of knowing 
that other 
people will 
have 
access to 
nature’s 
benefits
Satisfaction 
of knowing 
that a 
species or 
ecosystem 
exists
 17 
human life or a species can be thought of as having intrinsic value. An item with 
instrumental value is valuable because through that item a valuable objective can 
be achieved. For example, food has instrumental value because it maintains 
health.  
51. Intrinsic and instrumental values do not necessarily align with use, non-use, 
option and ethical values. For example, an ecosystem may have non-use value but 
only because satisfaction is gained from knowing that it continues to exist. The 
ecosystem’s continued existence is therefore instrumental in achieving value, but 
it would not have value in itself if no one found it satisfying that it existed. Indeed, 
in a welfare or well-being system of value the only item of intrinsic value is 
welfare or well-being; everything else is a means to achieving welfare or well-
being. 
52. Items of value may be incomparable, which means that the value of one 
item cannot be expressed in terms of the value of another item. For example, the 
value of a decrease in biodiversity may not be expressible in terms of years of 
good health lost. A consequence of incomparability is that loss and damage 
cannot be aggregated into a single number and trade-offs between mitigation, 
adaptation and residual damage can be difficult to make. 
53. It is a matter of debate as to whether values are incomparable or not. In a 
welfare-based system of values there are few issues of incomparability and all 
items can in principle be expressed in money terms, although ascertaining 
monetary values for non-economic items can be difficult in practice and not 
quantifying them may help decision makers (Spackman, 2013). However, in a well-
being or ethical system of values incomparability may be an issue. A simple 
difficulty in making comparisons of value, as may occur in the case of non-
economic items in a welfare-based system of values, may make aggregation 
unwise, even if there are no issues of outright incomparability. This is because 
aggregation makes the comparison on behalf of others. The alternative, of leaving 
difficult to compare impacts disaggregated, allows others to make their own 
comparisons. 
54. Non-economic items are often given economic valuations as a form of 
assessment, as explained in chapter V.2 above. For example, loss of life can be 
monetized using a concept known as the value of a statistical life, which measures 
people’s attitude to a change in mortality risk. When this process occurs it does 
not mean that the non-economic item has become an economic item. Instead, a 
non-economic item has, through indirect methods, been given an economic value 
as a means of assessment. This should be contrasted with the direct method of 
economic valuation via market prices that is possible for economic items. 
55. Items can have different values across time, space and possible states of 
the world. Difference in value across time refers to the fact that people often 
discount the value of an item in the future relative to the same item in the 
present. Both economic and non-economic items can be discounted, as both have 
value, although estimating the rate at which non-economic items are discounted 
can be challenging. Gollier (2012, p 248) provides an in-depth discussion on issues 
of discounting. Differences in valuation across space describe the fact that 
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different people within a time period can value an item in a different way. For 
example, a poor person may value an extra unit of money more than a rich 
person. Difference in valuation across possible states of the world refers to the 
fact that the future is uncertain and in some states of the world an item will be 
valued differently than in another state of the world. For example, a particular 
colony of animals will be more valuable if they are the last of the species than if 
they are one colony among many. 
56. Aggregating across time, space and states requires assumptions, such as the 
discount rate, that may be disputed and can hide important context. This implies 
that aggregation of loss and damage, if needed, must be done transparently and 
with care and the need for aggregation in many cases should be questioned. 
Issues of valuation, measurement and comparability can be summarized by the 
following questions: 
(a) What is valued? Humans have many systems of value, of which three 
major types are welfare, well-being and ethical and rights-based frameworks; 
(b) How is it valued? Items can have use and non-use values, from which 
finer distinctions can be made, such as existence non-use value or direct, 
consumptive, use value; 
(c) Where does the value reside? Items can have instrumental value, as 
they provide a way to achieve a valuable objective, or intrinsic value if they are 
valuable in themselves; 
(d) Is the value of different items comparable? It can be a matter of 
debate as to whether the value of one item can be expressed in terms of the 
value of another item. If there are difficulties in comparison it can be best to avoid 
aggregating values under one metric; 
(e) How does the value of an item vary across time, space and possible 
states of the world? An item in the future can often be perceived to have less 
value than the same item in the present, which is known as discounting; an item 
may have a different value to different people (i.e. the value of an item can vary 
across space); and an item may have a different value across states of uncertainty. 
Non-economic losses in the context of human activity 
57. Climate change affects the system of human activity and so an impact to a 
part of the system must be understood in the context of the entire system. Non-
economic losses occur in different parts of the system of human activity and 
figure 5 provides a model of human activity that allows such loss and damage to 
be understood in the context of the entire system. 
58. In figure 5 stocks of resources, some economic and some non-economic, 
provide flows of services and are also themselves transformed into other types of 
resource or consumed. For example, the stock of human capital provides a flow of 
work; natural capital, such as a mineral deposit, may be transformed into a 
machine, a type of physical capital; or natural capital, such as oil, may be 
consumed. In figure 5 initial stocks of resources are represented on the left, with 
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their flows of services in the dashed and dotted arrows. Final stocks of resources 
are on the right. 
59. These services and resources are used by individuals and society to achieve 
valuable objectives. The objectives of individuals and society can be very broadly 
defined and the implications of this for non-economic losses are explored in 
chapter III.0 above. Services and resources can be used as inputs to economic 
activity to provide consumption items, or they can be used directly by individuals 
and society. In figure 5 this is shown in the central section of the diagram by the 
box for economic activity and for individuals and society. Non-economic goods 
and services are primarily used in the latter way, although economic sectors also 
use non-economic goods and services to produce consumption items. 
60. Climate change affects human activity in a number of ways. Figure 6 
highlights this by adding diagonally-hashed arrows to figure 5. These arrows 
illustrate the changes in activity that climate change induces. Climate change can 
require the diversion of resources for mitigation and adaptation. It can also inflict 
loss and damage in the form of reduced flows of services from stocks and reduced 
levels of stocks themselves. The reduction and diversion of resources reduces the 
ability of individuals and society to achieve valuable objectives. The degree to 
which climate change prevents valuable societal objectives being achieved is the 
true measure of the total damage of climate change. Climate change can also 
reduce the stock of resources available to achieve future objectives, which is one 
reason why the impacts of climate change need to be considered over time. 
61. Ignoring non-economic loss results in a very limited understanding of the 
pathways along which total climate change damages occur. Figure 7 builds on 
figure 6 by highlighting, using a wave-hash background, the main areas of human 
activity in which non-economic losses occur.  
62. Many resource stocks are at least in part non-economic and so they are not 
accounted for in standard economic statistics. These include natural capital, such 
as biodiversity and ecosystems, social capital and cultural capital. Even standard 
economic inputs such as human capital and land can be affected by non-economic 
factors, such as loss of territory and loss of life and health, respectively. 
63. When resource stocks are affected by climate change, the flow of both 
economic and non-economic services is reduced, although only the former will be 
recorded in the national accounts. Non-economic service flows (such as spiritual 
services from ecosystems) tend to be ignored. 
64. Even if they were recorded, measures of economic welfare tend to focus on 
consumption rather than wider measures of individual and societal welfare. 
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Figure 5 
In this model of human activity, stocks of resources provide flows of services and are used themselves, in economic and non-economic ways, to achieve 
objectives that have value to individuals and society; stocks persist and are used to achieve objectives in the future 
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Figure 6 
Total damage from climate change can divert and reduce the flows of services from stocks and the levels of stocks themselves, as well  
as disrupting the economy; this is highlighted using a diagonal-hash background; this reduces the ability of individuals and society to achieve valuable  
objectives and can reduce the stock of resources available to achieve future objectives 
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Figure 7 
Non-economic losses are a subset of the total damage from climate change and tend to affect some resources more than others;  
these are highlighted using a wave-hash background. Non-economic losses also tend to directly affect individuals and society rather than primarily  
reducing economic activity, although this occurs to some extent 
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IV. A typology and overview of non-economic losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The incidence of non-economic losses 
65. Non-economic losses can be described as occurring in three distinct areas: 
private individuals, social items such as public goods and networks (connections 
between people) and the environment. Impacts to these areas can also give rise 
to economic losses and non-economic losses in these areas can also result in 
losses in other areas; for example, damage to the environment can affect private 
individuals. 
66. Many of the impacts of climate change on individuals will have direct 
economic effects. However, individuals may also suffer from non-economic losses 
in the form of loss of life and health, including mental health. 
67. Non-economic losses occur in societies when non-economic public or 
cultural goods are damaged or when networks are damaged. A network is a set of 
connections between people. The main types of such losses are losses to cultural 
heritage and indigenous/local knowledge and other social capital. These items are 
shared across all individuals in a society and so, while it is ultimately individuals 
who will incur the loss as explained in chapter 0 above, the incidence of the 
damage is social. 
68. The impacts of climate change on the environment will tend to be non-
economic because environmental goods and services are often not formally part 
of the economy. The environment can be considered to have two main assets that 
are susceptible to climate change: biodiversity and ecosystems. 
69. Figure 8 illustrates how types of non-economic losses discussed in chapter 
III.0 above are directly linked to individuals, social items and the environment. 
Box 2 
Chapter summary 
- Non-economic losses occur in three distinct areas: private individuals, society and 
the environment. More specifically, non-economic losses can be understood as 
losses of, inter alia, life, health, territory, cultural heritage, indigenous/local 
knowledge, biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
- Non-economic losses may occur through many channels. They may be related to 
both slow onset impacts (e.g. the loss of territory to sea level rise) and extreme 
events (e.g. loss of life in a cyclone). The loss may be directly linked to climate 
change (e.g. loss of ecosystems) or occur indirectly (e.g. malnutrition as a 
consequence of impacts in the agriculture sector). 
- The distinction between non-economic loss and economic loss will sometimes be 
blurred. For example, damage to natural ecosystems is primarily a non-economic 
loss, since ecosystem services are rarely traded on the market. However, there may 
be market impacts if the services the ecosystem provides are used as inputs to the 
market economy, such as food, fibre and water storage. 
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There will be indirect effects, as discussed in chapter III.3 above, which means 
that effects can influence one another; for example, a loss of biodiversity can 
affect elements of health. However, these indirect linkages are complex and 
therefore not presented in the figure for clarity. 
Figure 8 
Suggested types of non-economic loss can be categorized according to their direct occurrence  
on individuals, society and the environment 
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Note: Non-economic losses can have indirect impacts across individuals, society and environment. This figure 
displays the interlinkages of direct non-economic losses. 
 
The main types of non-economic losses 
70. The main types of non-economic loss described in this chapter are 
summarized in table 2, which also provides examples of these non-economic 
losses due to climate change. 
 
Society
Individuals
Environment
Loss of life
Health
Territory
Biodiversity
Ecosystem services
Cultural heritage
Indigenous 
knowledge
Incidence of direct 
losses
Type of non-
economic loss
Human mobility
  
Table 2 
Summary of the main types of non-economic losses 
Types of non-economic loss Description Example of climate-related loss Climate drivers Approaches to valuation 
Loss of life 
Loss of life is a clear 
example of a non-economic 
loss as it is a violation of 
the right to life 
The Russian heatwave in 2010 may have 
claimed 55,000 lives (World Bank, 2012). 
Torrential rainfall in December 2010 in Central 
and South America caused flooding and 
landslides in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic 
of), Colombia and Panama, which killed over 
100 people (NOAA, 2010) 
Direct losses from extreme 
weather events, indirect losses 
arising from climate-induced 
deterioration in health (see health 
for climate drivers of these) 
Number of lives lost is a clear metric on its 
own but it can be monetized using value of 
a statistical life methods. However, such 
methods of monetization may not be 
suitable in the context of a global threat 
such as climate change 
Health 
Human health incorporates 
physical, mental and social 
well-being and its non-
economic value stems from 
its contribution to well-
being 
Epidemiological evidence has pointed to a 
widespread environmental cause for recent 
outbreaks of cholera, rather than a point 
source contamination. For example, cholera 
epidemics are associated with positive surface 
temperature anomalies in coastal and inland 
lake waters (McMichael et al., 2003) 
Extreme air temperature, extreme 
weather events, floods and 
droughts, climatic effects on 
agriculture, spread of infectious 
disease vectors and reduction in 
cold weather 
Disability adjusted life-years are an 
established and widely used method of 
measuring health impacts in terms of years 
of healthy life lost. Health impacts tend 
not to be monetized, but it is possible 
Human mobility 
Displacement is the 
clearest case of non-
economic loss in the 
continuum of human 
mobility as non-economic 
items, such as security, 
dignity and agency, are 
impaired by displacement 
Permanent relocation plans identified in IDMC 
and OCHA (2009) consider the forced 
displacement of the 2,000 inhabitants of the 
Tulun (Carteret) and 400 of the Takuu 
(Mortlock) islands in Papua New Guinea. Over 
27,000 people were forced from their homes in 
Fiji by two flood disasters and the impact of 
Cyclone Evan in 2012. Cyclone Evan further 
displaced over 7,000 people in Samoa, where 
another 3,700 people were forced from their 
homes by floods (IDMC, 2013) 
Extreme weather events, 
particularly hydrometeorological 
events, and slow onset events 
past a tipping point can result in 
displacement 
The direct non-economic loss of 
displacement is intangible but the number 
of climate change-related displaced people 
can indicate the scale of the issue, while 
assessment of the risk of displacement can 
allow people to internally value potential 
loss and damage 
Territory 
Loss of territory has non-
economic value because 
territory provides 
sovereignty and a sense of 
place 
Predicted changes in sea level rise could 
inundate or increase the salinity of 12–15 per 
cent of agricultural land in the Nile Delta 
(Stabinsky and Hoffmaister, 2012) 
Inundation results in outright loss 
of territory, while other slow 
onset events, such as drought, 
salinization, land degradation and 
desertification, can make territory 
uninhabitable 
Sovereignty and sense of place have 
intangible benefits that are unique to a 
context and so valuation can be 
challenging due to subsequent 
incomparability; as a result, assessment 
may be best achieved through recognition 
of when territory is lost or threatened 
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Cultural heritage 
Cultural heritage can be 
tangible, for example 
historic buildings, or 
intangible, such as a body 
of traditional knowledge. 
Tangible cultural heritage is 
considered here. It has 
non-economic value 
because it contributes to 
social cohesion and identity 
Thousands of the distinctive houses of New 
Orleans, home to one of the largest collections 
of historic buildings in the USA, were damaged 
by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
A World Heritage site, known as the megalithic 
circles of Senegal and Gambia, is threatened by 
drought, which causes stone to crack 
(Berenfeld, 2008) 
Extreme weather events, such as 
floods and storms 
Slow onset events can also 
damage cultural heritage as 
changing climate conditions put 
structures under stress 
The risk of physical damage to cultural 
heritage can be estimated; however, the 
value of such damage is challenging to 
assess because the cultural items are 
unique and can have both use and non-use 
value 
Indigenous and local 
knowledge and other social 
capital 
Indigenous and local 
knowledge is knowledge 
that is unique to a 
particular cultural group or 
community. It often has 
strong links with the 
environment and is 
valuable as it is often 
spiritual, cultural and 
practical and contributes to 
social cohesion and identity 
The traditional cattle and goat farming 
practices of the indigenous peoples in Africa’s 
Kalahari Basin are being negatively affected by 
increasing temperatures and wind speed and 
increased desertification. Mild winters in 
Finland, Norway and Sweden prevent reindeer 
from accessing lichen, which is a vital food 
source. The subsequent decline in reindeer 
numbers and difficulties in reindeer herding is 
damaging Saami culture and communities as 
reindeer are central to their way of life (United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, 2008) 
Slow onset events change the 
characteristics of an environment 
and so undermine the basis of 
indigenous and local knowledge 
Valuation of indigenous and local 
knowledge must consider that the value of 
such knowledge is derived from 
interlinkages with and the cohesiveness of 
social networks 
Biodiversity 
Biodiversity describes the 
diversity among living 
organisms. It may have 
intrinsic value and species 
may have a right to exist. 
Biodiversity also provides a 
stock of genetic material 
and underpins many 
ecosystem services 
In the forests of Costa Rica, over the past 20 
years 110 endemic frog species (approximately 
two thirds) have become extinct. Research has 
shown that increasing temperatures have 
increased the prevalence of a fungus that is 
lethal to many frog species (UNESCO, 2007a) 
Climate change alters the 
conditions an ecosystem is suited 
to, so as the climate changes the 
ecosystem will shift to a new area, 
where the climate has the right 
conditions. If the ecosystem 
cannot shift, it will fail and 
transform into a different, often 
degraded, ecosystem 
Measurement of biodiversity, let alone 
valuation, is complex. Common metrics 
assess the richness of species in an area 
and also the number of threatened 
species. While biodiversity may have 
intrinsic value, identifying the instrumental 
value of the ecosystem services 
biodiversity provides is the primary 
approach to valuation 
  
Ecosystem services 
Ecosystems can be thought 
of as providing four main 
types of services: 
supporting, provisioning, 
regulating and cultural. 
Provisioning services, such 
as the supply of food, 
timber, fuel and water, 
often have a market value, 
although failure of these 
services can cause non-
economic losses. 
Supporting, regulating and 
cultural services tend to be 
non-economic services 
Globally, coral reefs are threatened by ocean 
acidification due to absorption of CO2. Coral 
reefs support marine and coastal ecosystems 
and provide shoreline protection, tourism, 
aesthetic and cultural services. Estimates of the
benefits of healthy coral reefs are high. 
Estimates of benefits in South Asia are USD 
23,100 to USD 270,000 per km
2
 depending on 
the reef. As coral reefs die these benefits will 
be lost (TEEB, 2009) 
Ecosystem services can be 
affected by changes in 
biodiversity as this is the natural 
capital from which ecosystem 
services flow 
Slow onset events, such as 
temperature and precipitation 
changes, are particularly 
disruptive to supporting and 
regulating services 
Extreme weather events can 
damage the ecosystems that 
provide cultural, recreational and 
spiritual services 
Ecosystem services can be valued using 
revealed and stated-preference methods 
to estimate a monetary value for the 
service; estimates from one location can 
be transferred to other locations 
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1. Loss of life 
71. Loss of life is a clear example of a non-economic loss and has a simple and 
powerful unit of account. The right to life is widely recognized as a fundamental 
human right. As a result, loss of life is a clear damage and accounting for loss of 
life by simply counting the number of lives lost is a powerful metric. 
72. Climate change may result in loss of life in direct ways, for example due to 
extreme weather events, or indirectly, for example through malnutrition as a 
result of food shortages arising from declining agricultural productivity due to 
slow and incremental changes in climate. The attribution of loss of life to extreme 
weather events is relatively straightforward, although gaps in understanding 
remain. Attribution of loss of life due to slow onset events and/or indirect impacts 
is far more uncertain. This is because many more factors aside from the climate 
event may have contributed to the loss of life in the case of an indirect impact 
than in the case of a direct impact. 
73. Loss of life can be valued in monetary terms based on observed choices in 
everyday life that people make to expose themselves to risks of fatality so as to 
gain material benefit. Such estimates are known as the value of a statistical life. 
These estimates may not be appropriate in the context of a global threat such as 
climate change as they depend, inter alia, on the income of the population from 
which the estimate is derived (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). As incomes vary 
significantly across the world this implies a variation in the value of a statistical 
life. This may be incompatible with the view that each person has an equal right 
to life and therefore the loss of a life is of equal significance around the world. 
2. Health 
74. Human health has many facets. The World Health Organization (WHO) uses 
the following definition: “health is a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (IHC, 1946). 
Despite its many aspects, which are often of intangible value, there has been 
significant work on valuing health impacts in general, given its centrality to human 
life and the need to allocate scarce resources. 
75. Climate change can affect health in a variety of ways. The WHO has 
identified the following (WHO, 2011): 
(a) Extreme air temperatures: heatwaves are a direct contributor to 
deaths from cardiovascular and respiratory disease; increased temperatures can 
also exacerbate pollution and aeroallergens, such as pollen; 
(b) Extreme weather events: floods and storms can cause injury and loss 
of life and also damage property, health services and mental health. A lack of 
shelter and adequate care, especially in the aftermath of an extreme weather 
event, can damage health; displacement and forced migration to avoid extreme 
weather events can also increase stresses on health; 
(c) Floods and droughts: aside from the risk of injury from extreme 
weather events, floods and droughts can reduce and degrade fresh water 
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supplies, which are essential to health and hygiene; contaminated water can also 
transmit infectious diseases; 
(d) Climatic effects on agriculture: decreasing crop yields can lead to 
malnutrition, especially among populations that rely on subsistence farming; 
(e) Potential spread of infectious disease vectors: insects that carry 
infectious diseases are sensitive to climate and so, as the climate changes, their 
range may change, introducing infectious diseases to new areas; 
(f) Reduction in cold weather: some populations in higher latitudes of 
the northern hemisphere are expected to benefit from a reduction in cold-related 
illness and death as average temperatures increase. 
76. The impact of climate change on human health is thought to have been low 
so far, claiming, in 2004, 0.2 per cent of global deaths and 0.4 per cent of global 
DALYs; almost all of these losses occurred in low and middle income countries 
(WHO, 2009). Future health impacts arising due to climate change will depend 
significantly on adaptation, as socioeconomic conditions, health-care systems and 
levels of disaster risk management heavily influence health outcomes. The WHO 
estimates that 14–47 per cent of the annual cost of adaptation will be health 
related (WHO, 2011). If resources for adaptation are insufficient then loss and 
damage due to health impacts will occur. 
77. Health impacts are often measured using DALYs. For example, this is the 
metric used in the WHO Global Burden of Disease study (World Health 
Organization, 2009). A DALY can be thought of as one lost year of ‘healthy’ life. A 
DALY is calculated as the sum of the years of life lost and years lost due to 
disability. Years of life lost is a measure of premature mortality and is a count of 
the years before an ideal life expectancy in which death occurs. Years lost due to 
disability is a measure of the burden of disability due to disease on quality of life. 
It is calculated by multiplying the average duration of the disease until remission 
or death by a disability weight. DALYs are not without criticism, for example 
regarding the method of determining disability weights, but DALYs, or similar 
metrics, such as quality adjusted life years, are frequently used in health policy.  
3. Human mobility 
78. Human mobility can be viewed as a continuum from completely voluntary 
movements to completely forced migrations (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2012). The Cancun Adaptation Framework recognizes displacement, 
migration and planned relocation as forms of human mobility that can be induced 
by climate change.1 While there is no definition under the Convention, migration 
tends to refer to voluntary movement, while displacement tends to refer to 
forced movement. 
79. Displacement is the clearest case of loss and damage across the continuum 
of human mobility, although other forms of human mobility could be considered 
as a type of loss and damage.2 Loss and damage can result from displacement, for 
                                                          
 
1
 Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 14(f). 
 
2
 For example, decision 3/CP.18, paragraph 7(f)(vi), recognizes migration, displacement and human 
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example displacement can cause distress and a loss of health or social networks. 
However, displacement also constitutes a unique type of loss and damage in itself 
and is not just a cause of other types of loss and damage. It is displacement as a 
(non-economic) type of loss and damage in itself that is the focus of this technical 
paper. Displacement can result in a loss of security (including legal rights) and 
agency (the ability to control one’s location and livelihood), among other things.3 
In the same way that a loss of health is a type of loss and damage because health 
is important to well-being, displacement is a type of loss and damage because 
security and agency, which are lost due to displacement, are important to well-
being. Furthermore, such loss and damage of displacement is a non-economic loss 
as security and agency are non-economic items. The economic losses of 
displacement, such as the loss of possessions, and indirect non-economic losses, 
such as loss of health and social networks, should be understood as losses from 
displacement. 
80. Displacement is described as the clearest case of mobility-related loss and 
damage for two main reasons. First, because it is clear that it directly harms 
security and agency, among other things. Second, displacement is also a clear 
example of the potential limits of adaptation and, as explained in chapter 0 above, 
loss and damage can be understood as harm arising from the physical impacts of 
climate change that are not mitigated or adapted to. For other types of human 
mobility, such as voluntary migration and planned relocation, context is required 
to assess the extent to which the acts themselves are a form of loss and damage. 
Voluntary migration and planned relocation tend to be identified as adaptation 
measures, and therefore they reduce exposure to some types of loss and damage. 
However, that is not to say that they cannot be harmful in themselves in some 
contexts. For example, planned relocation may impair agency if it is against the 
will of the residents. As voluntary migration and planned relocation can be 
considered forms of adaptation, rather than responses to the limits of 
adaptation , their status as a type of loss and damage is further complicated. 
Trapped populations are also an unclear case. These are groups of people whose 
mobility is restricted, and so cannot migrate as a form of adaptation but nor can 
they be displaced (Warner et al., 2013), despite potentially suffering human 
mobility-related loss and damage. Overall, human mobility is a continuum and 
loss and damage is not clearly defined and so, while displacement is the clearest 
case of loss and damage in human mobility, it is not necessarily the only case. 
81. Human mobility can be induced by both slow onset and extreme weather 
events. Extreme weather events can cause displacement while the risk of them 
can induce migration or planned relocation. Slow onset events can induce 
migration and planned relocation as forms of adaptation to the slow onset event 
and can also cause displacement when the stresses from a slow onset event reach 
a tipping point.4 Climate and weather-related disasters currently cause significant 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
mobility as issues of loss and damage. 
 
3
 This is not a complete list of the losses that are a result of displacement and further research and 
consensus is required to expand this list. 
 
4
 Owing to the multicausal nature of human mobility generally, distinguishing such tipping points can 
be very difficult. For further discussion on this topic in the context of climate change see Hugo (2010) 
and Warner et al. (2013).  
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displacement, with an estimated 32 million people displaced by these hazards in 
2012, mostly for short periods of time within their national borders (IDMC, 2013). 
However, it should be noted that there is currently a lack of clear evidence 
systematically linking climate variability and migration, although there are clear 
instances of extreme hydrometeorological events resulting in displacement 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2012). 
82. The non-economic losses of displacement are intangible and therefore the 
value of the losses is hard to measure. However, the physical number of displaced 
people can be identified and this can provide a guide to the scale of the issue. 
That said, measurement of climate change related displacement suffers from a 
lack of standard concepts and methodologies as well as barriers to data collection. 
Assessment and presentation of the risk of displacement can also go some way to 
identifying the potential loss and damage due to displacement, even if this loss 
and damage is not explicitly valued. Indeed. full quantification is likely to be 
inaccurate if not impossible; instead identifying and educating about the risk of 
displacement can allow people to determine their own valuations and bring this 
risk into their own decision-making. 
4. Territory 
83. Territory is an area of land, and associated exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
that is under the jurisdiction of a State. Land provides economic benefits; for 
example, it can be cultivated or built on and provides resources, such as those in 
an EEZ. It also provides non-economic benefits; for example, it can host 
ecosystems or be an area of outstanding natural beauty. Territory can also have 
non-economic value simply because it is an area that belongs to a group and so 
forms part of that group’s identity. This sovereignty and sense of place are the 
non-economic benefits that are the focus of this chapter. Sovereignty describes 
the ability of the group in control of the territory to self-determination. In contrast 
to sovereignty, which is the characteristic of a society, a sense of place is felt by 
individuals. It describes the importance that an individual ascribes to an area and 
the way in which the area forms part of their identity. 
84. Slow onset events can result in a physical loss of territory through 
inundation due to sea level rise. Deltaic nations and small island developing States 
face the greatest risk of this, with atoll countries possibly facing a loss of 
sovereignty due to sea level rise (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
2007). Loss of territory could arguably also arise due to drought, salinization, land 
degradation and desertification. In these cases the ability to inhabit the territory is 
reduced even though the territory is still part of the land. The concept could have 
an even broader interpretation; for example, natural characteristics, such as flora 
and fauna, could change due to climate change and as a result the sense of place 
that some individuals have could also change if this sense is rooted in the flora 
and fauna of the area. 
85. Sovereignty and sense of place are intangible benefits and so assessment of 
the risk of loss and damage due to a loss of territory is challenging. However, loss 
of sovereignty can be seen as a violation of the right to self-determination and so 
there is no need for a metric beyond the fact of the violation itself. Indeed, the 
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loss of sovereignty of atoll countries has been suggested as a threshold beyond 
which climate change can be considered ‘dangerous’ (Barnett and Adger, 2003). 
Loss of a sense of place is not as clearly defined as loss of sovereignty, nor can the 
costs of losing a sense of place be as clearly communicated, as each experience is 
unique. As a result, assessing the non-economic loss arising from the loss of a 
sense of place is very difficult and the most that may be achieved is to recognize 
that such a loss is likely to occur. 
5. Cultural heritage 
86. Tangible cultural heritage “refers to monuments, groups of buildings and 
sites with historical, aesthetic, archaeological, scientific, ethnological or 
anthropological value” (UNESCO, 2008). Cultural heritage can also include 
intangible heritage, considered to be a legacy of practices, expressions, 
knowledge and skills of a community (UNESCO, 2013). Physical cultural heritage is 
the focus of this chapter. Intangible heritage could be considered part of social 
capital, which is considered in chapter IV.B.6 below. 
87. Climate change can threaten cultural heritage through extreme weather 
events, which may destroy artefacts and buildings, often through flooding and 
storms. Slow onset events can also damage cultural heritage as changing climate 
conditions put structures under stress. For example, heritage buildings tend to be 
made of more porous materials and are not as sealed from the elements as 
modern buildings (UNESCO, 2007b). This means they can be more susceptible to 
changes in temperature and humidity, effects that the Climate for Culture project 
in the European Union is investigating. The project is using computer simulations 
to assess the effect of such changes on the structure and stability of historic 
buildings and the collections of artefacts within them (Climate for Culture, 2012). 
88. As described above, the risk of physical damage to cultural heritage can be 
estimated. However, assessing the loss of value from such physical damage is 
harder to gauge. Cultural heritage provides an intangible benefit with no clear 
unit of measurement. For example, UNESCO World Heritage Sites are those with 
‘outstanding universal value’, which is judged by experts according to a list of 
criteria developed by the World Heritage Committee (UNESCO, 2012). In addition 
to this, the non-economic loss from the destruction of cultural heritage is 
particularly hard to judge because cultural heritage may have non-use value. That 
is to say that value may often be derived by people simply from the continued 
existence of the cultural item and its contribution to their cultural identity rather 
than from visiting it. So assessing losses from visitor numbers may not be reliable. 
Furthermore, items of cultural heritage are unique and irreplaceable and 
therefore their value cannot be judged from assessments of similar items or 
through the cost of replacement. 
6. Indigenous and local knowledge and other social capital 
89. Indigenous and local knowledge is knowledge that is unique to a particular 
cultural group or community. It is often knowledge of the environment or 
knowledge developed with close reference to the environment. Such knowledge 
is valuable as it is often spiritual, cultural and practical and contributes to social 
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cohesion and identity. It can be considered as a part of social capital, which 
describes “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that 
facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2007). 
90. A changing climate can affect indigenous and local knowledge as it changes 
the environment on which such knowledge is based. If climate change invalidates 
or prevents the development or transmission of knowledge then this can affect 
the spiritual and cultural well-being of the community. It can also have economic 
impacts; for example, indigenous knowledge is often used to forecast weather 
and determine when to plant crops. Indigenous knowledge also benefits wider 
groups; for example, it is often used to preserve biodiversity5 or to identify 
medicines. Indigenous knowledge is also often valuable in adaptation planning 
and so a loss of such knowledge can increase vulnerability to climate change, 
which may lead to other types of losses. Indigenous knowledge is particularly at 
threat from climate change as indigenous groups tend to live in climate-sensitive 
areas, such as the Arctic, margins of deserts, rainforests and at high-altitude 
regions. Climate change can also affect broader social capital by breaking or 
stressing social network, by, for example, displacement, forced migration or 
resource shortages. 
91. While indigenous and local knowledge and other social capital can be 
considered to be at risk of loss and damage it is hard to judge the magnitude of 
possible impacts. This is because these sources of social value are not countable. 
There are no units for the quantity of social capital and indeed it is a 
misconception to think of social capital as a discrete, countable resource. Instead, 
social capital should be understood to be a holistic resource, where value is 
derived from the interlinkages and cohesiveness of the network. Also, when 
judging the risk of loss and damage to social capital, vulnerability to climate 
change should be considered. Social capital can adapt to circumstances, and is 
continually evolving, and can also be transmitted. So, for some communities, 
social capital may be robust to the effects of climate change, or the basis of social 
capital could shift away from climate-sensitive sectors. Such robustness is unlikely 
to apply to indigenous communities due to an emphasis on preserving tradition 
and on the environment and due to difficulties in transmitting indigenous 
knowledge. 
7. Biodiversity 
92. Biodiversity means “the variability among living organisms from all sources 
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems” (United Nations, 1992). Biodiversity has non-
economic value because the simple existence of biodiversity can be of intrinsic 
value to people and species may be considered to have a right to exist. 
Biodiversity also provides a stock of genetic material and underpins many 
ecosystem services (secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010, 
p.94). 
                                                          
 
5
 The value of indigenous knowledge in the protection of biodiversity is recognized in article 8(j) of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity <http://www.cbd.int/traditional/>. 
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93. Before considering the impact of climate change on biodiversity it is 
important to consider the complexity of measuring any changes in biodiversity. 
The Streamlining European Biodiversity Indicators 2010 programme has 26 
indicators of biodiversity (European Environment Agency, n.d.), chosen from 
about 200 possible indicators (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 
2008). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Environmental Outlook considers four indicators: mean species abundance 
(MSA),6 threatened species, forest area and marine stocks (OECD, 2012). So 
understanding the impact of climate change on biodiversity requires assessment 
across a number of metrics. 
94. Regardless of the metric, biodiversity is, in general, under threat, and 
climate change is likely to provide significant stress in addition to the strains 
already arising on biodiversity due to economic development and population 
growth. Climate change alters the conditions an ecosystem is suited to. So as the 
climate changes the ecosystem will shift to a new area, where the climate has the 
right conditions; or, if the ecosystem cannot shift, it will fail and transform into a 
different, often degraded, ecosystem. The OECD estimated that “climate change is 
projected to become an increasingly important pressure in the baseline,7 driving 
just over 40 per cent of additional global MSA loss between 2010 and 2050” 
(OECD, 2012). With regard to threatened species, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change states that “approximately 20–30 per cent of plant and animal 
species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in 
global average temperature exceed 1.5–2.5°C” (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2007). 
95. Valuation of changes in biodiversity is challenging as its intrinsic value can 
be hard to articulate. A major global initiative on TEEB8 concluded that focusing 
on the instrumental value of biodiversity can be effective, stating that “an 
ecosystem service perspective should inform economic valuations of biodiversity, 
focusing on how decision makers can include the benefits and costs of conserving 
or restoring nature in their considerations” (TEEB, 2010b). Valuation of ecosystem 
services is discussed in chapter IV.B.8 below. 
96. Valuation of changes in biodiversity is especially challenging and important 
in developing countries. Biodiversity hotspots tend to be in developing countries, 
as figure 9 shows, and so the greatest burden of valuation may occur in areas with 
a low capacity for such valuation. Not only is biodiversity often greatest in 
developing countries, but people tend to have a greater reliance on the 
ecosystem services that biodiversity supports. In addition, methods of valuation 
are often designed in developed countries and may not be appropriate in the 
developing country context, often for institutional reasons, such as the 
                                                          
 
6
 MSA represents the average response of the total set of species belonging to an ecosystem to a change 
in their environment. As such it describes species richness; a biome achieving an MSA score of 1 is in 
a pristine state, with full species richness, while a biome scoring 0 is a biome devoid of original 
species. The abundance of species in a pristine state, that is a state with minimal human interference, 
is often established via modelling techniques. 
 
7
 The baseline is a scenario assuming no new policies for environmental issues, addressed in the OECD 
Environmental Outlook to 2050. 
 
8
 See <http://www.teebweb.org>. 
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predominance of the informal economy over the formal, as well as cultural 
reasons. As a result, participatory methods of valuation, rather than economic 
methods, have been suggested in such contexts (TEEB, 2010a). 
Figure 9 
Many biodiversity hotspots are in developing countries and are at risk from  
ecosystems shifting in response to climate change 
 
Note: The map shows the overlap between biodiversity hotspots, regions with exceptional concentrations of 
endemic species undergoing exceptional loss of habitat (Myers et al., 2000) and the projected changes in terrestrial 
ecosystems by 2100 relative to the 2000, as presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 
Fischlin et al., (2007), figure 4.3(a), p. 238. The changes should be taken as only indicative of the range of possible 
ecosystem changes and include gains or losses of forest cover, grassland, shrubland and woodland, herbaceous 
cover and desert amelioration. 
Source: World Bank (2009) based on Myers et al. (2000) and Fischlin et al. (2007). 
8. Ecosystem services 
97. Marine and terrestrial ecosystems can be thought of as providing four main 
types of services: supporting, provisioning, regulating and cultural (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). This classification of services comes from the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and has been widely adopted. Provisioning 
services, such as the supply of food, timber, fuel and water, often have a market 
value. However, supporting, regulating and cultural services tend to be non-
economic services. Supporting services describe the role of ecosystems in the 
various environmental cycles, such as the nutrient cycle and photosynthesis. 
Regulating services describe the role of ecosystems in regulating the climate, 
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floods and other extremes of nature. Cultural services are the spiritual, aesthetic, 
educational and recreational uses that people derive from ecosystems. 
Figure 9 
Ecosystem services can be mapped to constituents of human well-being 
 
Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ( 2005). 
98. The value of ecosystem services has been the subject of major research 
programmes in recent years and conceptual frameworks and valuation methods 
have been developed. Ecosystem services can be linked to constituents of human 
well-being, as figure 10 illustrates. These services can also be described as having 
ecological, sociocultural and economic benefits and values (TEEB, 2010a). 
Ecological values describe the support that aspects of ecosystems provide to each 
other. For example, trees can control erosion and animals are part of food chains. 
Such support makes an ecosystem resilient and so enables the continued 
enjoyment of sociocultural and economic benefits. Sociocultural benefits reflect 
the contribution of ecosystems to people’s mental, cultural and spiritual well-
being and to their sense of place and identity. The economic value of ecosystem 
services can come from a broad range of sources. It can come from the use of 
ecosystems, such as food and recreation, or from non-use, such as satisfaction in 
preservation, either for future generations or for the sake of preservation in its 
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own right. The sum of these non-market sources of value is known as the total 
economic value, which is explained in more detail in chapter 0 above. 
99. Climate change can result in non-economic losses from ecosystems in a 
number of ways. The biodiversity that underpins an ecosystem can be affected, as 
described in chapter IV.B.5 above. In the same way that destruction of physical 
capital can lead to a reduced flow of production, so can destruction of natural 
capital lead to a lower flow of ecosystem services. Ecosystem services can also be 
affected through other mechanisms. Slow onset events, such as temperature and 
precipitation changes, can disrupt supporting and regulating services, while 
extreme weather events can damage the ecosystems that provide cultural, 
recreational and spiritual services. Provisioning services will be affected, primarily 
in changes in fish catch, yields of crops and changes in growth patterns of forests. 
As previously mentioned, provisioning services often have economic value, for 
example the revenue from the sale of fish and agricultural produce, and so these 
losses are economic losses. However, for subsistence farmers and other 
vulnerable people, a reduction in provisioning services can threaten food security 
and the impact this has on well-being is a non-economic loss. 
100. There are a variety of ways for valuing changes in ecosystem services in 
monetary terms. These methods are described in more detail in chapter V.2 
below. However, applying these techniques can be challenging, especially in 
developing countries. TEEB (2010b) suggests three steps that can be taken, noting 
that steps two and three may not be appropriate in contexts where there are 
capacity constraints, for example in developing countries, and that step one, 
simply identifying affected ecosystem services, may be sufficient. The three steps 
are the following: 
(a) For each decision identify and assess the full range of ecosystem 
services affected and the implications for different groups in society; 
(b) Estimate and demonstrate the value of ecosystem services; 
(c) Capture the value of ecosystem services and seek solutions. 
V. Methods for assessing non-economic losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3 
Chapter summary 
- There is a lot of experience worldwide with the assessment and valuation of non-economic impacts of 
human development and natural phenomena, ranging from environmental impact assessment of local 
infrastructure projects, to climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessment at the global 
scale. 
 
- However, assessment and valuation of non-economic impacts remains very difficult, owing to the many 
uncertainties involved and the essential role of value judgements. These difficulties are usually magnified 
where analytical capacity is limited. 
 
- The paper identifies four broad categories of valuation technique: economic valuation, multicriteria 
decision analysis (MCDA), composite risk indices and qualitative/semi-quantitative methods. 
 
These methods differ in the extent to which they attempt to make non-economic effects commensurable 
with economic effects, for aggregation into an overall value for a course of action such as a policy. 
Economic valuation seeks to put money values on non-economic losses, while MCDA and composite risk 
indices use formal scoring and weighting. Qualitative/semi-quantitative methods do not attempt to 
aggregate to the same extent, so it is up to the users of the analysis to compare and evaluate the many 
effects of policy choices. There are advantages and disadvantages to all of these approaches. 
 39 
 
Frameworks for assessment and valuation of non-economic losses 
101. Chapter V.0 presents a review of existing frameworks that have been used 
to assess and value the non-economic effects of human development and natural 
phenomena, with the aim of identifying lessons for assessing and valuing non-
economic losses from climate change. 
102. The assessment of non-economic losses associated with climate change 
faces many challenges, but it is by no means the first time that policymakers have 
confronted the question of how to take into account the non-economic effects of 
human development and natural phenomena. Rather, over several decades and in 
many countries, experience of assessment has been accumulated through the 
assessment of the environmental and social impacts (usually alongside the 
economic impacts) of new economic development, of existing economic activity 
and of natural environmental phenomena. 
103. Many frameworks have been developed for these purposes, including the 
following: 
(a) EIA; 
(b) SEA; 
(c) Environmental risk assessment; 
(d) Economic appraisal/CBA; 
(e) Wealth/capital accounting; 
(f) Vulnerability assessment; 
(g) Disaster loss/damage assessment; 
(h) CCIAV. 
104. These frameworks are described in more detail in the annex. They have 
been developed for different purposes and are summarized in table 3 . 
Table 3 
Relevant frameworks for the assessment of the non-economic effects of human  
development and natural phenomena 
Assessment framework What is its purpose? How does it incorporate non-economic effects? 
Environmental 
impact assessment  
Ex ante assessment of environmental impacts 
of local/regional development projects and of 
economic and social impacts as support to 
planning/zoning decisions 
Development projects always have non-
economic effects, which should be 
measured and valued alongside economic 
effects before making decisions on 
whether to permit development 
Strategic 
environmental 
assessment 
Ex ante assessment of environmental impacts 
of national/regional policies, plans and 
programmes, known as ‘strategic actions’ and 
of economic and social impacts as support to 
strategic decision-making 
Strategic actions always have non-
economic effects, which should be 
measured and valued alongside economic 
effects before choosing a policy, plan or 
programme 
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Assessment framework What is its purpose? How does it incorporate non-economic effects? 
Environmental risk 
assessment 
Ex ante assessment of human and 
environmental effects of hazardous production 
processes and products as support to planning 
and permitting decisions 
Hazardous production processes and 
products pose non-economic risks to the 
natural environment and human health, 
which environmental risk assessment aims 
to quantify as an input to planning and 
permitting decisions 
Cost–benefit 
analysis 
Assessment of monetary costs and benefits of 
policies, plans, programmes and/or projects, 
either ex ante to aid planning/strategic 
decision-making, or ex post to inform on 
performance of existing measures 
Many of the benefits and costs of policies, 
plans, programmes and projects are non-
economic, however, cost–benefit analysis 
aims to give them parity of esteem by 
putting a monetary value on them 
Wealth/capital 
accounting 
Comprehensive wealth/capital accounting 
seeks to understand how (typically) nations 
manage their asset bases, with a view to 
assessing whether they are developing 
sustainably  
The national asset base includes not only 
economic capital, but also non-economic 
capital such as natural capital. Non-
economic capital needs to be assigned a 
monetary value if the overall 
wealth/savings position is to be measured 
formally 
Vulnerability 
assessment 
Assessment of the vulnerability of societies at 
multiple scales to natural environmental 
pressures, alongside other stressors, often as 
an input to disaster risk reduction initiatives 
Vulnerability is usually conceived to have 
multiple determinants, some of which are 
non-economic (e.g. nutrition levels, 
strength of social networks) 
Disaster 
loss/Damage 
assessment 
Ex post assessment of the impacts of natural 
disasters, especially economic costs 
Natural disasters have non-economic 
effects that could be quantified and even 
monetized, although in practice this is 
rarely done 
Climate change 
impacts, adaptation 
and vulnerability 
assessment  
Assessment of the impacts of climate change 
on societies at multiple scales, either to aid 
adaptation planning or to understand benefits 
of mitigation 
Impacts of, and vulnerability to, climate 
change include non-economic dimensions 
Source: Authors. 
105. EIA is one of the most widely used frameworks in this list. First developed in 
the United States of America in the late 1960s, it is now used as a means of 
systematic ex ante assessment of the impacts of development projects such as 
dams and roads in over 100 countries worldwide, including a number of least 
developed countries, as well as by various multilateral institutions. Best practice is 
the holistic assessment of the economic and non-economic effects of a project. 
Moreover, given the large number of planning decisions where EIA is appropriate, 
the framework must be relatively quick and easy to use. In particular, the 
valuation stage of EIA is often based on simple qualitative or semi-quantitative 
methods, as explained in chapter V.0 below. 
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106. SEA builds on the foundations of EIA but is applied to strategic actions, such 
as choices by public authorities over what policies, plans and/or programmes to 
choose. While newer and less widespread than EIA, it still aims to embed SEA in 
strategic decision-making by national, regional and local governments across the 
world. The nature of strategic actions, unlike that of local development projects, 
requires that SEA methodology place more emphasis on complex, indirect effects 
on the environment and society. Even more so than in EIA, assessment and 
valuation in SEA tends to be relatively simple and non-quantitative. 
107. Environmental risk assessment has developed as a fairly specialized, 
science-based and engineering-based framework for the quantification of risks 
arising from hazardous production processes and products. It is the environment 
and human health that are subject to these risks, making them in large part non-
economic. The environmental risk assessment framework offers a heavily 
quantitative, expert-driven model for the assessment of non-economic losses 
from climate change, which may or may not be appropriate, but is in any case 
very different from EIA/SEA. The framework also places uncertainty centre stage 
in contrast to most other frameworks included in Table 3. 
108. Economic appraisal, CBA specifically, is widely used in some countries and 
international organizations to inform policy, plan, programme and project choice,9 
or for ex post evaluation of measures taken. It has a history of application going 
back to the first half of the twentieth century. CBA involves the measurement and 
monetization of all the effects of development. Monetization of non-economic 
effects should therefore be a central element. Since market prices do not by 
definition exist for non-economic effects, these effects must be assigned ‘shadow 
prices’ using a variety of techniques. Such techniques are complicated and costly 
to apply, so assessing the possibility of transferring estimates made in other 
contexts is important. Chapter V.0 below discusses this in greater detail. 
109. There is an increasing focus in many countries on expanded notions of 
national wealth and national accounts that do not just include narrow measures 
of economic output, savings and wealth, but also non-economic savings and 
sources of wealth, such as natural assets. The World Bank has been a prominent 
advocate of the approach and measures comprehensive wealth and adjusted net 
savings for many countries, while the UN System of Environmental-Economic 
Accounting (SEEA) contains internationally agreed standards for keeping account 
of natural resources alongside the economy, including ,but not limited to, 
monetary accounting of natural resources. 
110. Vulnerability assessment is a growing field, gaining importance owing to 
interest from development organizations involved in disaster risk reduction and to 
interest in analysing the impacts of global environmental change. Many different 
definitions of vulnerability exist, though most of them have in common a focus on 
three elements: exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. Sensitivity and 
adaptive capacity, in particular, have non-economic elements. Vulnerability 
assessment, then, involves the measurement of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive 
                                                          
 
9
 In principle, CBA, as a method or a tool, could be used as an element of, for instance, EIA or SEA, 
but in practice this tends not to be the case. 
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capacity. A range of techniques exist from quantitative global risk indices to more 
qualitative community-based self-assessment. 
111. Disaster loss/damage assessment takes place after a natural disaster and is 
intended to reveal the extent of losses, such as fatalities and economic losses, 
including insured and uninsured losses. It is often conducted as a rapid survey to 
inform responses such as humanitarian aid. 
112. Recent years have witnessed an increase in the specific application of 
appraisal and assessment techniques to climate change impacts and adaptation 
planning, such as CCIAV, at multiple scales, from the global to the local. These 
come in a wide variety of forms, some of which are impact-based and build on 
quantitative simulation modelling (so-called integrated assessment), and some of 
which are closer in tradition to vulnerability assessment. The techniques that have 
been developed are not new in the sense that ideas have been imported from 
other areas such as environmental assessment or vulnerability assessment, but 
the specific focus is climate change. 
Valuing and evaluating non-economic losses 
113. This technical paper now turns to the specific issue of valuation, distilling 
the experience from diverse assessment settings in chapter V.0 above into four 
different, broad valuation methods: (a) economic valuation, (b) MCDA, (c) risk 
indices and (d) qualitative/semi-quantitative approaches. These methods are 
compared and contrasted, with strengths and weaknesses identified. 
114. While valuation in common parlance is associated with money and 
therefore economic methods, a brief but broad definition of the act of valuation 
is, in fact, simply “comparing objects” (Dasgupta, 2001). A wider range of 
approaches is thus relevant. Evaluation is similarly just “comparing the relative 
merits of actions” (Dasgupta, op. cit.). 
115. In the context of addressing non-economic losses associated with climate 
change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change, (e)valuation is then the stage at which the 
significance of non-economic losses is defined and adaptation options can be 
compared on the basis of how much they reduce non-economic losses, and in 
how much their parameters, such as cost, diverge. 
2. Economic valuation 
116. Economic valuation for CBA or wealth/capital accounting involves valuing a 
change in the provision of a good or service or a change in the value of an asset, 
respectively, by multiplying the change in the quantity in its natural unit by the 
price per unit:  
price x quantity. 
117. However, as discussed above market prices only exist for a subset, 
sometimes a limited one, of all of the goods, services and capital stocks affected 
by development. They do not by definition exist for non-economic goods, services 
and capital stocks. Therefore, the task is to infer so-called ‘shadow’ prices where 
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market prices do not exist, i.e. in non-market valuation. This is no small task; a 
sophisticated theoretical and practical framework has been developed for it, 
summarized in numerous textbooks, manuals and sets of official guidelines. The 
main methods of non-market valuation are (a) revealed preference methods and 
(b) stated preference methods. Given that (a) or (b) have already been used to 
generate values somewhere, it is also possible to use (c) benefits transfers in 
order to apply these values to new contexts without repeating the original 
valuation work. 
118. Revealed preference methods exploit the fact that, while few 
environmental and social goods/services are traded explicitly on markets, some 
are traded implicitly and therefore their value can be estimated by analysing 
actual market purchases of linked and related goods. The four principal methods 
of revealed preference valuation are summarized in table 4. 
Table 4 
Revealed preference methods of economic valuation 
Method Revealed behaviour Conceptual framework Applications 
Hedonic pricing Land values; job 
choices 
Demand for 
differentiated 
products 
Land value and wage 
determinants 
Travel cost Participation in 
recreation activity at 
chosen site 
Household 
production; 
complementary 
goods 
Recreational 
demand 
Averting 
behaviour/defensive 
expenditure 
Time costs; 
purchases to avoid 
harm 
Household 
production; 
substitute goods 
Health: morbidity 
and mortality 
Costs of illness Expenditures to treat 
illness 
Treatment costs Health: morbidity 
Source: Adapted from Pearce et al. (2006). 
119. It is evident that revealed preference methods can be used for non-
economic effects but only those which can be linked to actual market behaviour in 
a tractable way, e.g. health effects and the contribution of environmental goods 
and services to land values. The strength of revealed preference methods usually 
held to be that they are based on actual, rather than hypothetical, market 
behaviour, thus avoiding various biases that may be present in making 
hypothetical purchases. 
120. By contrast, hypothetical behaviour is the cornerstone of stated preference 
methods, which use questionnaire surveys (either contingent valuation or choice 
experiments) to analyse people’s future behaviour in a constructed market for a 
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non-economic good/service. The constructed or ‘contingent’ market describes the 
good/service to be purchased and the institutional context behind its provision, 
the latter of which can have a strong effect on stated values.  
121. Stated preference methods are more flexible than revealed preference 
methods, in that they can be used to capture almost any aspect of the economic 
value of non-market goods/services. So there will be some non-economic effects 
that could only be priced, directly or via benefits transfer, using stated preference 
valuation. In other cases, stated preference methods provide a rival approach to 
revealed preference methods, such as in quantifying the value of a statistical 
life/value of a life-year.  
122. However, the hypothetical nature of these methods is the major concern in 
judgements on whether the price estimates they yield are reliable and 
unbiased/valid. Much scepticism exists on this point, often well d, but it is worth 
noting that the use of such values has been subject to official, expert scrutiny and 
endorsed in policy settings in many countries (famously in 1993 by NOAA in 
valuing the environmental costs of the Exxon Valdez oil spill with a view to 
informing compensation requirements in the United States courts). Furthermore, 
interest in developing the science has led to the publication of thousands of 
studies over the past 20–30 years, so these biases have been extremely 
thoroughly scrutinized relative to some weaknesses in other methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 4 
Economic valuation in developing countries 
This box describes some prominent examples of economic valuation in developing countries. 
Reddy and Behera (2006) applied economic valuation to economic and non-economic losses associated 
with industrial water pollution in rural communities in India. They estimated costs associated with losses 
to agricultural production, human health and livestock through an analysis of household-level data, 
comparing an affected and a non-affected village in Andhra Pradesh, South India. The non-economic 
losses were found to be the more significant losses, with direct impact on human health and livelihood. 
They were measured in terms of sick days and medical treatment required as a result of the consumption 
of polluted water. The net impact of pollution was estimated to be USD 53 per household per annum. 
Quah and Chia (2013) studied the losses from increases in particulate matter in the air in Singapore. They 
estimate the health costs associated with a 15 µg/m3 change in concentration at roughly USD 3.75 billion, 
or about 2 per cent of the gross national product in 2009. They use a benefit transfer method, where the 
economic valuation of health effects is estimated based on other research into the willingness to pay for 
reducing risk of premature mortality, and a cost-of-illness approach to value changes in morbidity. The 
authors note that whereas health effects due to air pollution are relatively easy to identify, placing an 
economic value on mortality and morbidity using the benefit transfer approach is challenging. Firstly, 
research on this topic is comparatively scarce, and secondly, existing studies were carried out in a 
developed country context and it is thus necessary to assume that people in developed countries have 
preferences similar to those of the inhabitants of Singapore.  
Leiman (2013) documented the economic valuation of a series of cost–benefit analyses (CBAs) that were 
carried out to inform state decision-making on air quality by the South Africa National Economic 
Development and Labour Council. A total of 32 interventions were considered in the CBAs taking into 
account direct financial costs and benefits, direct economic costs and benefits, and indirect economic 
impacts. The distributional effects were also considered. The primary concern of the economic valuation 
was with the health costs associated with air pollution, so it was decided to use existing dose-response 
functions from other countries and focus on reductions in premature mortality and impacts on statistical 
life and disability-adjusted life-years. This was then valued using a benefit transfer methodology to 
convert estimates from studies in the United States into ones applicable to the South African case. The 
CBA was complemented by an analysis of impacts on stakeholders and on employment over time.  
These three examples show how non-economic losses are valued and taken into consideration in policy 
decisions in developing and emerging countries. CBA in these countries relies heavily on the benefits 
transfer methodology which may bias the results; however, these analyses have proved to be effective 
tools in policymaking in all three cases. 
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123. The Benefit transfer method is very important in practice given the time 
and resources needed to conduct original revealed and stated preference studies. 
The method is difficult to apply correctly; account must be taken of the quality of 
the original estimates to be transferred and of differences in context (e.g. 
income), which should be controlled for quantitatively. Therefore, inaccuracy is a 
major concern; it rises as the original study becomes more dissimilar to the ‘site’ 
to which estimates are to be transferred. Nonetheless, much effort has been 
expended in creating databases of valuation studies that can be used as an ‘off-
the-shelf’ benefit transfer, such as the environmental valuation reference 
inventory (EVRI). 
124. Economic valuation can provide monetary estimates of non-economic 
losses from climate change. Since money is the numéraire, these are in principle 
fully comparable with economic losses and with an enormous variety of other 
effects of decisions, such as the costs of adaptation. Commensurability is thus one 
of the main attractions of the approach, especially given the importance of money 
values for decision makers. Those who identify with the normative foundations of 
welfare economics (essentially modern utilitarianism) will also find it convincing a 
priori, while opponents of these foundations, for example those who would place 
more emphasis on human rights, will see this as a disadvantage. 
125. Concerns remain though about the reliability and validity of shadow prices 
of non-economic goods/services/assets obtained through these valuation 
techniques. Moreover, in some cases it may simply be practically infeasible to 
infer shadow prices where no primary studies exist that could be credibly used as 
a basis for the benefit transfer method. In reality, then, the best efforts to 
conduct holistic CBA or capital accounting may continue to disregard some non-
economic effects. One could say that the presence of some non-monetized effects 
in CBA/capital accounting cannot be avoided, and that one should rather ask how 
significant such effects are relative to those that are included, and if they have the 
capacity to change the advice given. 
126. In addition to uncertainty about shadow pricing, other aspects of the 
valuation process, notably the discounting of future monetary flows, are also 
subject to significant uncertainty and results of the analysis are often highly 
sensitive to these uncertainties. However, it is worth stressing that all valuation 
methods must deal in some way or another with issues such as weighing different 
effects in different time periods. These concerns are thus not unique to economic 
valuation; they are just more explicit. 
127. A simple technique that has been suggested for understanding how large 
non-economic effects would have to be in order to change a decision is that of 
‘switching values’. For instance, if CBA tells us that a particular development 
action has positive net present value and should be implemented despite 
concerns for non-economic losses such as damage to environmental/cultural 
assets that have not been monetized, one option is to ask how large the value of 
such damage would have to be in order to reverse the decision (yield negative net 
present value), and in turn to ask how likely it is that the value of this damage 
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could be so high (Spackman, 2013). A good example of this approach is offered by 
Hahn and Passell (2010). 
128. The use of economic valuation techniques in CBA, where the objective is to 
assess the merits of a particular project, has a corollary in national accounting, 
where the objective is to create aggregate indicators of economic performance 
and well-being. Green/wealth accounting techniques aim to broaden national 
accounting frameworks by incorporating the value of non-economic assets, such 
as social capital and environmental capital. Green accounts use the same 
economic valuation techniques as CBA to enrich macroeconomic decision-making 
and discuss notions such as economic performance and national wealth in terms 
broader than just economic output, savings and investment. 
 
Box 5 
Botswana’s wealth/capital accounting system 
An example of wealth/capital accounting can be found in Botswana. Botswana has long 
been a pioneer in natural resource management and is now working with the Wealth 
Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) partnership to ensure 
that national accounts used to measure and plan for economic growth include the value 
of natural resources. WAVES, a broad coalition of United Nations agencies, 
governments, international institutes, nongovernmental organizations and academics, 
has developed a workplan detailing activities for 2012–2016 in collaboration with the 
government of Botswana. 
According to WAVES, Botswana’s natural capital is worth a third of its total wealth, 
consisting of a combination of minerals, energy, protected areas, crops, pasture land and 
non-timber forest products.  
Since 1966 Botswana has prepared ten national development plans. The current 
priorities to generate economic growth reflect the importance of non-economic items. 
They include nature-based tourism, mining and agriculture and aim to diversify the 
economy away from diamond mining and to reduce poverty. To plan appropriately for 
these development goals, information about natural resource endowments must be 
gathered. 
The government has identified four strands of work that will help fill in key information 
gaps on non-economic items and thus improve decision-making. These strands are: 
(a) Implement revised indicators that account for natural capital, including 
adjusted net national income and adjusted net savings, and build 
comprehensive wealth accounts to assess the prospects for long-term, 
sustainable growth; 
(b) Build detailed accounts of Botswana’s energy resources and energy use to 
assess the optimal energy mix for the future and examine the role of 
Botswana’s coal in a green economy; 
(c) Create national and ecosystem-based tourism accounts to inform management 
of eco-tourism in four key ecosystems: Okavango, Chobe, Makgadikgadi Pans 
and Central Kalahari; 
(d) Compile water accounts in order to manage scarce water supplies and 
contribute to the policy on a national water tariff, scheduled for 2013–2014. 
The four strands are designed to run in parallel to, and feed into, other policy areas and 
programmes. Currently, the institutional arrangements that are needed to implement the 
workplan are being developed. The WAVES programme hopes to strengthen the process 
of development planning by ensuring a true consideration of natural resources and 
ecosystems and so enable better decisions. 
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3. Multicriteria decision analysis 
129. The principal quantitative rival to economic valuation is MCDA, a technique 
developed in management science to aid coherent decision-making in the face of 
complexity. The notion of coherent decision-making comes from normative 
decision theory and is usually taken to be utility maximization, observing a set of 
simple and generally uncontroversial behavioural precepts or axioms. MCDA has 
been usefully defined as “a way of looking at complex problems that are 
characterized by any mixture of monetary and non-monetary objectives, of 
breaking the problem into more manageable pieces to allow data and judgements 
to be brought to bear on the pieces, and then of reassembling the pieces to 
present a coherent overall picture to decision makers” (DTLR, 2001, chapter 6). 
130. At the heart of MCDA is the selection of a set of criteria against which 
various alternative actions are to be evaluated, the scoring of the performance of 
each action against each criterion using a consistent scoring scheme, and lastly 
and perhaps most importantly the weighting of the various criteria. In this way 
each alternative action can be given a single weighted score, which can be 
compared with the weighted scores of the other actions. Full commensurability is 
thus obtained, as in economic valuation, between the actions being explicitly 
evaluated, but, unlike economic valuation, not with other actions outside the 
scope of the analysis. 
131. MCDA is used perhaps more sparingly in environmental, social and 
economic assessment than CBA and other (e)valuation methods. Again, done 
properly it is resource- intensive, especially if it is carried out with a strong 
emphasis on deliberation and stakeholder involvement in the process. 
Nonetheless one can find many individual examples of its application, including to 
controversial issues such as radioactive waste management. In the context of 
climate change policy, MCDA has found use in the preparation of virtually all 
national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) – see box 6. 
132. The differences between economic valuation and MCDA are in some 
respects obvious (e.g. the former uses money as a numéraire while the latter uses 
an arbitrary scoring system), while in other respects they are subtle. In particular, 
the methods mainly differ in their approaches to weighting. CBA contains its own 
form of implicit weighting in the shape of market and shadow prices. The price 
level indicates the strength of preference and it is the preferences of people 
participating in markets as consumers or in revealed and stated preference 
studies as representative subjects that count. By contrast, in MCDA the weighting 
is done by a group of people involved in making the decision in question, e.g. 
policymakers and managers. MCDA does not usually aim for representation of the 
population, rather the whole point is to help decision makers structure the 
problems they face and come to coherent decisions, given their goals. Thus much 
of the emphasis is on the deliberative and procedural aspect of the approach, 
with respect to whoever is participating in the MCDA. On the other hand there is 
clearly the risk that the process lacks legitimacy, especially since the results of 
MCDA can be very sensitive to the weights chosen. 
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133. The somewhat less information-intensive scoring and weighting system 
used by MCDA makes it easier to deal with highly intangible non-economic effects 
in MCDA than in CBA for which primary studies of shadow prices may not exist as 
discussed above. However, this does not necessarily imply that the resulting 
valuation is more reliable or valid. 
4. Risk indices 
134. The composite risk indices developed for some vulnerability assessments 
are worth mentioning at this point, e.g. the WorldRiskIndex introduced in box 7, 
because they share many similarities with MCDA. In particular, they are also 
constructed by scoring vulnerability on multiple criteria and then weighting the 
criteria to create a single index value. Hence such risk indices are subject to most 
of the same advantages and disadvantages identified in relation to MCDA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 6 
Multicriteria decision analysis to design a national adaptation programme of action 
Multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) has been applied by least developed countries, 
including Zambia and Bangladesh, to devise their national adaptation programmes of 
action – NAPAs (Ministry of Environment and Forest Bangladesh, 2005; Ministry of 
Tourism Environment and Natural Resources Zambia, 2007). MCDA serves mainly as a 
tool for the teams developing NAPAs to rank the identified necessary adaptation actions 
by priority, thereby allowing decision makers to select projects that yield the highest  
benefits to society (economic and non-economic). 
Zambia’s dependency on natural resources makes the country highly vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change. Sensitive sectors are agriculture and food security, wildlife, 
forestry, water and energy, and human health. Zambia developed its NAPA by 
evaluating the impacts of climate change on these sectors. It used MCDA to rank 39 
identified adaptation actions in order of urgency, highlighting ten immediate priority 
adaptation interventions. The NAPA team applied the following rating and ranking 
approach: the three focus areas of sustainable development (economic, environmental 
and social) were rated as equally important. A total of 14 indicators for the three areas 
were selected, including contribution to economic growth, impact on Millennium 
Development Goals and impact on health, with each project scored 1–9, from weakly to 
extremely important, in contributing to the indicators. The top three priority projects 
identified were: strengthening of early warning systems across the country, promotion of 
alternative sources of livelihoods, and adaptation to the effects of drought.  
Bangladesh is particularly vulnerable to climate change-related disasters, including 
cyclones and flooding. Bangladesh applies MCDA in selecting a list of priority activities 
in its NAPA. The NAPA notes that there is a lack of concrete, quantifiable data in some 
places and areas, which implies that MCDA is more appropriate than cost–benefit or 
cost-effectiveness analysis. It cites community-led decision-making, stakeholder 
preference, expert judgment, national goals and strategies as key inputs in MCDA. More 
than 40 projects were identified, of which 15 were selected as priority actions through a 
national stakeholder consultation.  
The criteria used were: 
(a) Impacts of climate change on the lives and livelihoods of the communities; 
(b) Poverty reduction and sustainable income generation of communities; 
(c) Enhancement of adaptive capacity in terms of capabilities at community and 
national level; 
(d) Gender equality (as a cross-cutting criteria); 
(e) Enhancement of environmental sustainability; 
(f) Complementary and synergy with national and sectoral plans and programmes; 
(g) Cost effectiveness. 
Among the priority projects selected are the reduction of climate change hazards 
through coastal afforestation with community participation and providing drinking water 
to coastal communities to combat enhanced salinity due to sea level rise. 
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135. Of course the nature of the task is different, in that MCDA is usually used to 
give structure to a particular decision between alternative courses of action (e.g. 
configuration of a NAPA), while risk indices are constructed to compare 
vulnerability in different places, with a more indirect connection between the 
analysis and the actions. Consequently risk indices tend to be created by expert 
organizations without necessarily having the strong procedural emphasis on a 
‘best practice’ deliberative MCDA. Not all MCDAs, on the other hand, are 
deliberative in this way. 
5. Qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches 
136. It is tempting to think that appraisal and assessment must always include 
some sort of formal, quantitative (e)valuation, such as CBA or MCDA, but in fact 
the majority of it, embodied in routine EIA, SEA etc., does not. Rather, information 
on the multiple effects of development, existing economic activity or natural 
Box 7 
The WorldRiskIndex 
The WorldRiskIndex, which has been developed by the United Nations University 
Institute for Environment and Human Security in cooperation with the Alliance 
Development Works, is an attempt to score on a single index the risk of becoming a 
victim of disasters resulting from extreme natural events. The index could be applied at 
multiple scales from the national to the local as a means of identifying risk hotspots and 
informing risk reduction strategies. The annual WorldRiskReport ranks 173 countries in 
its index. 
The concept underpinning the index is that the risk of becoming a victim of disasters 
resulting from extreme natural events depends on exposure to extreme natural events on 
the one hand, and vulnerability on the other hand. Vulnerability in turn depends on 
susceptibility, short-term coping capacities and long-term adaptive capacities, so that the 
WorldRiskIndex has four components overall: 
1. Exposure to natural hazards; 
2. Susceptibility; 
3. Coping capacities; 
4. Adaptive capacities. 
Within this framework, the index is constructed in hierarchical fashion. First, for each of 
the four categories above, a set of multiple indicators is chosen. These are standardised 
on a scale from 0 to 1 and then combined using a weighting scheme. Then the composite 
indices of 1–4 are themselves combined using another weighting scheme and rescaled 
into a percentage. The similarities between constructing such an index and carrying out 
MCDA are obvious. According to the methodology described for the construction of the 
WorldRiskIndex, the weighting scheme was chosen using a mix of expert opinion from 
a survey of mainly development cooperation specialists and statistical (factor) analysis.  
According to the 2012 version of the index, global hotspots for disaster risk can be 
found in Oceania, Southeast Asia, the southern Sahel and Central America. These are 
areas where exposure to natural hazards and climate change is combined with high 
vulnerability owing mainly to a low level of socioeconomic development. Moreover, 8 
of the 15 highest risk countries are island states, which, owing to their proximity to the 
sea, are particularly exposed to cyclones, flooding and sea level rise. 
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environmental phenomena is brought together in a more disaggregated form, and 
it is left to the decision makers in support of whom the analysis has been 
conducted to form their own views on the trade-offs suggested and their 
implications for the decision. There are many reasons for this, including 
institutional cultures and preferences, but one major factor is that doing so is less 
resource-intensive, as costly CBA/MCDA is avoided. 
137. According to this approach, formal evaluation usually stops at the 
presentation of an impact matrix/summary table. An example is given in box 8, 
which is actually from CCIAV, in which various climate risks are scored on a simple, 
qualitative scale and brought together but are neither weighted nor combined. 
Who does the scoring is clearly important; typically the assessment is carried out 
according to the expert subjective judgement of the team. It is not always the 
case that the various effects are transposed onto a common scoring scale, as in 
the example shown in box 8. Sometimes each effect is expressed in a different 
numéraire, usually according to the natural way of measuring it (e.g. costs in 
financial terms, employment effects in number of jobs created/lost, pollution 
effects in physical units, amenity/cultural effects on a qualitative scale or even 
simply by textual description). 
138. Good examples of such matrices/tables have the advantage that the trade-
offs inherent to the choices facing decision makers are transparent. In CBA, for 
instance, this may not be the case as the various positive and negative effects can 
be subsumed in the overall net present value of the options analysed. 
139. A key feature of this approach is that it places the responsibility for making 
the trade-offs on the decision maker rather than the analyst. Views differ on 
whether this is advantageous, with some pointing to the benefits of decision 
makers having greater ‘ownership’ over the key trade-offs, and others pointing to 
the possible inconsistencies and biases introduced when decision makers do not 
have the help of formal analytical tools. 
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Box 8 
The United Kingdom’s climate change risk assessment 
There are many examples of the use of qualitative and semi-quantitative methods of 
impact (e)valuation in environmental impact assessment, strategic environmental 
assessment, climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessment (CCIAV) 
and elsewhere. A recent example from the sphere of CCIAV is the climate change risk 
assessment (CCRA) performed in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, which was tasked with collecting, comparing and summarizing, for the national 
government, the latest evidence on the risks and opportunities presented by climate 
change for the United Kingdom up to 2100. 
Many aspects of this CCRA will be of interest to those developing methods to assess 
non-economic losses from climate change elsewhere, for instance the use of scenarios 
and model-based climate predictions. At the same time, there have been criticisms of 
this CCRA that are also instructive, for example its failure to adequately incorporate 
risks to the United Kingdom from climate impacts occurring beyond the United 
Kingdom. Here the paper will focus, however, on how the various risks from climate 
change to the United Kingdom are valued and compared in evaluation. 
This CCRA involved an assessment of hundreds of different kinds of climate risk in 
different sectors. Some potential risks were quantified and costed in economic terms, 
others, such as areas of land affected or numbers of people harmed, were quantified in 
natural units but not monetized, while still other estimates were based on expert 
elicitation or simply qualitative reviews of the evidence. 
In order to compare risks, this CCRA used a common qualitative/semi-quantitative 
scale, rating each risk “low”, “medium” or “high”. This rating was based in part and 
where possible on quantitative thresholds such as pounds of damage or lives affected, 
but expert judgement was required in most places, including where to set such 
thresholds. Because of significant uncertainty about the magnitude of climate risks, it is 
worth noting that what is classified as high risk depends further on the number of 
scenarios or confidence interval over which the magnitude of risk is judged to be high. 
In addition to assessing the magnitude of the risks, the CCRA incorporated a similar 
qualitative/semi-quantitative assessment of the degree of confidence in the risk estimates 
(from “low” to “very high”) and assessment of the perceived urgency of adaptation 
measures to manage them as a function of the speed of onset of high consequences and a 
preliminary assessment of adaptive capacity. 
Figure 11 illustrates how some of this information and analysis is brought together in a 
combined assessment of the highest magnitude risks (positive and negative) and their 
associated confidence levels. 
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Figure 11 
Example risk matrix from the United Kingdom’s climate change risk assessment 
Source: HR Wallingford (2012). 
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6. Synthesis 
140. The following table is a synthesis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the approaches discussed here, where, given the similarities, MCDA and 
composite risk indices are combined. 
Table 5 
Comparison of methods for valuating non-economic losses 
 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Economic valuation Structured, systematic approach 
to evaluation of non-economic 
and economic effects 
Facilitating economically efficient 
adaptation via full 
commensurability of non-
economic effects of measures 
with economic effects and with 
effects of policy in other domains 
Salience of economic values with 
decision makers may promote 
political prioritisation of 
adaptation 
Unreliability of and uncertainty about 
monetary values and other aspects of 
economic appraisal such as discounting 
Economic efficiency may not be judged 
to be the appropriate decision criterion 
Resource-intensive 
Emphasis on expert input and summary 
values can leave decision makers 
disconnected from the process 
Multicriteria decision 
analysis /composite risk 
indices 
Structured, systematic approach 
to evaluation of non-economic 
and economic elements 
Full commensurability possible 
between options evaluated 
Puts decision makers at the heart 
of the evaluation process 
Relatively easy to incorporate 
non-economic effects 
Generally resource-intensive if method 
is employed to the full 
Generally lacking robustness in scoring 
and weighting choices, a problem more 
acute for non-economic elements 
where there is less evidence to inform 
scores and weights assigned 
Lacking transparency for those not 
involved 
Depending on who is involved in the 
evaluation process it can lack legitimacy 
Qualitative and semi-
quantitative 
approaches 
Avoiding uncertainties inherent in 
explicit aggregation across effects 
Generally more transparent than 
methods involving 
scoring/weighting/pricing 
Relatively easy to incorporate 
non-economic effects 
Less resource-intensive 
Putting onus on decision makers to 
implicitly perform comparisons, 
aggregation and make judgements 
based on reading of analysis. This opens 
up more risk of inconsistency and bias 
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VI. Managing the risks of non-economic losses 
Incorporating non-economic value into economic decision-making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141. The assessment methods and valuation techniques introduced in chapter V 
above contain a blueprint for how public and private decision makers can take 
into account the non-economic impacts of their actions. Many countries have 
adopted these techniques, both in the developed and the developing world. Yet 
significant institutional challenges remain. Accounting fully for non-economic 
factors in decision-making is still the exception rather than the rule. 
142. Incorporating non-economic values into economic decision-making, for 
example through environmental impact assessments or cost–benefit analysis, 
would go a long way towards ensuring that non-economic systems are robust and 
healthy. There is evidence that well-maintained ecosystems are better able to 
deal with climate change-related stress than those subject to anthropogenic 
pressure (ASC, 2010). In some instances adaptation itself can add to pressure on 
ecosystems, for example if shoreline protection results in reduced coastal habitat. 
Again, the incorporation of non-economic impacts into decision-making would 
help to identify and manage the trade-offs. There are many more examples of 
Box 9 
Chapter summary 
- Incorporating non-economic values into economic decision-making would greatly 
increase the likelihood that non-economic systems remain robust and healthy. 
- However, using the techniques of chapter V as a matter of course requires 
institutional adjustments and a change in appraisal mentality. Monitoring, assessing 
and managing non-economic impact is not standard practice yet in the way that 
financial and economic appraisal are. 
 
- Making good adaptation decisions may reduce the risk of economic and non-
economic losses alike, as the two are often linked. For example, flood protection will 
help to avoid losses related to production interruptions, an economic loss, as well as 
distress and the outbreak of disease, which are non-economic losses. 
 
- A key adaptation challenge is to set the right priorities for the immediate future, with 
a focus on win-win measures that yield immediate benefits (e.g. flood protection, 
environmental protection) and measures that affect the long-term vulnerability 
profile of countries (e.g. planning and infrastructure decisions).  
 
- It is important to recognize the practical limits to adaptation. A second adaptation 
challenge is therefore to remove barriers to effective adaptation by both public and 
private decision makers. Problems may be institutional, policy-related, market-
related, cognitive or related to insufficient funding, information and skills. The way 
non-economic impacts are treated – measured, valued and assessed – in adaptation 
decision-making is one such barrier and can affect the level of non-economic loss. 
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how acknowledging non-economic values leads to better decisions that enhance 
the welfare of the societies concerned (e.g. TEEB, 2010a, 2010b). 
143. A broader observation is that the future vulnerability of economic and non-
economic systems is determined by large-scale trends and development 
decisions, such as patterns of migration, decisions where to build, how to develop 
and what to produce, as much as by micro-level adaptation choices (Bowen, 
Cochrane and Fankhauser, 2011). Decisions on economic diversification, for 
example away from agriculture or into different forms of agriculture, may affect 
the impact of future droughts and their social and humanitarian costs. Decisions 
on the development of coastlines can similarly affect vulnerability to future sea 
level rise. These decisions would be better informed if they were based on an 
understanding of economic prosperity broader than just economic output, e.g. a 
set of green national accounts. 
144. A first step in managing non-economic losses from climate change is 
therefore to systematically adopt and employ non-economic evaluation and 
appraisal techniques. Non-economic value has to be recognized not just in 
environment ministries but also in finance, economics and planning ministries, 
where key economic decisions are often taken. 
145. Doing so raises practical issues of institutional capacity and political culture. 
Setting up sound environmental and social appraisal procedures requires 
administrative depth, technical skill and the ability to enforce the rules. This is 
often lacking both at the national and subnational level. Governments need to 
create a legal basis that incorporates the need for non-economic assessments into 
the framework of government decision-making. Technical assistance may be 
required to roll out the methods across government departments and ensure 
their uniform application.  
146. Assigning a truthful value to non-economic effects is analytically very 
complex. It requires a good understanding not just of valuation, but also of how 
non-economic systems function and how they react to stress. However, as 
chapter V above has shown, not all evaluation techniques are equally demanding, 
and there are ways of adjusting appraisal techniques to different institutional 
contexts. International standards, such as the UN-led System of Environmental 
and Economic Accounting, contain pragmatic guidelines that acknowledge 
analytical difficulties and allow countries to get started and learn by doing. In fact, 
some developing countries are at the forefront of environmental decision-making 
(see box 6 above).  
Making good adaptation decisions in addressing non-economic losses 
147. Making good adaptation decisions will reduce the risk of economic and 
non-economic losses alike, as the two are often linked. For example, flood 
protection will help to avoid loss related to production interruptions (economic 
loss), as well as distress and the outbreak of disease (non-economic loss).  
148. A small body of literature has emerged on how to make good adaptation 
decisions and spend adaptation money wisely (e.g. Fankhauser and Burton 
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(2011)). These studies emphasize the need for good project appraisal to avoid 
maladaptation, as outlined above. Another key theme is the need to set the right 
adaptation priorities for the immediate future.  
149. While it is important not to delay action, not all adaptation has to be 
initiated at once. Adaptation is a long-term problem that will occupy policymakers 
for many decades to come. Even in high vulnerability areas some actions are more 
urgent than others. In general, there are three main situations where it is 
advisable to bring adaptation forward (Fankhauser et al., 1999, 2013; ASC, 2010). 
All three of them are of direct relevance to the avoidance of non-economic losses: 
(a) Adaptations with early, robust benefits. Starting early is important if 
the proposed measures have immediate benefits that would otherwise be 
forgone. Disaster risk management falls into this category (UNISDR, 2013), as do 
adaptations with strong development co-benefits, such as better health and 
sanitation systems. Another intervention that can yield non-economic co-benefits 
early on is the protection of environmental assets. For instance, preserving coastal 
wetlands yields many economic and non-economic benefits in terms of ecosystem 
services, including protection against coastal flooding. A study of the 
Muthurajawela Marsh in Sri Lanka found that flood attenuation accounted for two 
thirds of the benefits that the wetland provides (Emerton and Kekulandala, 2003); 
(b) ‘Low-regrets’ adaptations with long lead times. It makes sense to 
fast-track adaptation measures that are known to be crucial for the future, if they 
take time to ramp up. The development of new skills (e.g. in assessment and 
valuation techniques like CBA and MCDA) arguably falls into this category. 
Building adaptive capacity through knowledge systems, risk governance, 
institutional strengthening and training is another activity that can take time and 
should therefore start early; 
(c) Areas where decisions today could ‘lock in’ vulnerability profiles for a 
long time. Fast-tracking adaptation is desirable if a wrong decision today makes 
countries more vulnerable in the future and if those effects (e.g. in the case of 
environmental degradation) are costly to reverse. Many big development 
decisions fall into this category, including those on land use planning (e.g. the 
development of coastal zones) and long-term infrastructure (e.g. the design of 
new water and sanitation systems). Analysing lock-in is more complicated than 
the other two categories and requires more complex assessment techniques that 
deal adequately with climate uncertainty (e.g. Ranger et al. (2010)). 
Addressing practical limits to adaptation in non-economic sectors 
150. It is important to remember the practical limits to adaptation when 
considering loss and damage for if it were possible to adapt to the full range of 
adverse effects of climate change then there would be no loss and damage. 
However, there are constraints on achieving such adaptation and identifying 
these constraints indicates when a loss and damage assessment may be 
necessary. 
 57 
 
151. In the context of non-economic losses the most important constraints to 
adaptation are likely to include (see Fankhauser and Soare (2012)): 
(a) Institutional and financial constraints: perhaps the main institutional 
constraint to adaptation, particularly in developing countries, is a lack of adaptive 
capacity – including sufficient financial and technical resources. Even in developed 
countries, adaptation performance can be hampered by governance, policy and 
regulatory problems. A prominent example is the water sector, where poor 
regulation, under-investment and pricing subsidies often prevent effective 
adaptation. In other areas, such as environmental protection, adaptation may be 
held back by governance failures, corruption or strong vested interests. 
Institutional competition, layered bureaucracy and entrenched rules and 
traditions can hamper the ability of organizations to respond to changing 
circumstances; 
(b) Market failures: market imperfections – some generic, others 
particular to adaptation – that may affect the effectiveness of adaptation include 
externalities, or more generally a lack of coordination, between adaptation agents 
(e.g. up-river and down-river communities), asymmetric information (e.g. about 
the risk profile of properties) or moral hazard (e.g. for people with insurance 
coverage or with at-risk communities holding out for government assistance). 
Path dependence may affect the choice between protection and relocation, for 
example, for highly vulnerable historic locations; 
(c) Behavioural and information barriers: adaptation may suffer from a 
lack of awareness, information and skills which means that climate risks are 
under-managed. More profoundly, complex, long-term adaptation decisions may 
be affected by well-known cognitive barriers that lead to inertia, procrastination 
and, indirectly, high discount rates. 
152. A priority role of national governments and the international community is 
to overcome these barriers where possible and provide an environment that is 
conducive to effective adaptation by individual decision makers: individuals, 
households, firms and local communities. 
153. It should be recognized that there are ultimately also technological, 
biophysical or economic constraints to adaptation. If climate risks were severe, 
there may be cases where the protection of some natural or societal assets is no 
longer a realistic option. Prominent examples in the natural world include glaciers 
and coral reefs, which provide many ecosystem services but face clear limits to 
adaptation. Similarly, a small island nation may become inundated due to sea 
level rise and its population relocated. Even though the nation would persist, 
without its original geographical location the people of the nation would suffer a 
loss in terms of displacement, culture, belonging, history and sovereignty. 
154. This reinforces the urgency for the most crucial and urgent measure for 
reducing climate risks and enable economic development in a sustainable 
manner: combining adaptation with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to 
a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system. 
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VII. Conclusions 
155. This technical paper responds to a request by the Parties at COP 18 to carry 
out further activities under the work programme on loss and damage, including 
the preparation of a technical paper on non-economic losses (decision 3/CP.18, 
para. 10(b)). 
156. This technical paper defines non-economic losses as losses that are not 
commonly traded in markets (either formal or informal) and are therefore not 
captured by the system of national accounts. This technical paper distinguishes 
among three main categories of non-economic losses: loss to private individuals 
(e.g. loss of life, health impacts, human mobility), loss to society (e.g. loss of 
territory, cultural heritage, indigenous knowledge) and environmental loss (e.g. 
biodiversity and ecosystem services). Losses may occur through many channels. 
They may be related to both slow onset impacts (e.g. the loss of territory to sea 
level rise) and extreme events (e.g. loss of life in a cyclone). The loss may be 
directly linked to climate change (e.g. loss of ecosystems) or occur indirectly (e.g. 
malnutrition as a consequence of impacts in the agriculture sector). 
157. The absence of a market price makes the assessment of non-economic 
losses challenging, but their effect on human welfare is no less important. Non-
economic loss is an important aspect of the total cost of climate change, alongside 
mitigation cost, adaptation costs and economic loss and damage. In many 
developing countries, non-economic losses may well be more significant than 
economic losses. 
158. Recommendation: Recognizing, assessing and managing the risk of non-
economic loss should be a central aspect of climate change policy. 
159. This technical paper outlines the main techniques available to assess non-
economic losses. Many of them are well known. This is not the first time that 
policymakers have confronted the question of how to take into account the non-
economic effects of policy or investment decisions. There is experience in many 
countries in the assessment of environmental and social impacts of new economic 
development, of existing economic activity and of natural environmental 
phenomena (e.g. environmental impact assessment, cost–benefit analysis, 
disaster loss assessment and many more). This technical paper identifies four 
broad categories of valuation technique: economic valuation, MCDA, composite 
risk indices and qualitative/semi-quantitative methods. That is, valuation is 
interpreted not solely as assigning monetary values but more broadly as the act of 
‘comparing the relative merits of actions or objects’. The different assessment and 
evaluation methods all have their advantages and disadvantages. 
160. Recommendation: Policymakers should make use of the full range of 
available assessment and evaluation techniques. The suitability of each depends 
on institutional contexts as well as the problem at hand. 
161. Whatever method is chosen, the assessment and valuation of non-
economic impacts remains very difficult owing to the many uncertainties involved 
and to the essential role of value judgements. These difficulties are usually 
magnified where analytical capacity is limited. Because of this complexity, it is 
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very difficult to express aggregate damage in a single number representing the 
‘total non-economic loss’. 
162. Recommendation: A detailed quantification of non-economic loss should 
rely on a number of different metrics, not just a single number representing the 
‘total non-economic loss’. 
163. This technical paper then outlines out the main implications for the design 
of practical adaptation actions. Two main challenges are highlighted. The first 
challenge is the identification and quantification of non-economic value and its 
inclusion in decision-making using the techniques introduced in this technical 
paper. Incorporating non-economic values into economic decision-making is an 
important first step towards ensuring that non-economic systems are properly 
managed and are robust and healthy. However, using non-economic evaluation 
techniques as a matter of course requires institutional adjustments and a change 
in appraisal mentality. 
164. Recommendation: Policymakers should make the use of non-economic 
evaluation techniques a requirement in project appraisal. The Convention may aid 
this process by providing hands-on guidance that would ensure non-economic 
impacts are treated – measured, valued and assessed – appropriately in public 
decision making. 
165. The second challenge is adaptation to climate change more broadly. Many 
of the issues faced by the adaptation community are the same whether the aim is 
to prevent economic or non-economic loss. Making good adaptation decisions will 
reduce the risk of economic and non-economic losses alike, as the two are often 
linked. In practice, however, there are many potential barriers to effective 
adaptation. Overcoming them is one of the main challenges of good adaptation in 
addition to the need to set appropriate priorities. 
166. Recommendation: Policymakers and the international community should 
make the removal of adaptation barriers an immediate priority for adaptation 
assistance in developing countries, whether the barriers are institutional, funding-
related, policy-related, market-related, cognitive or due to insufficient 
information and skills. 
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Annex 
Frameworks for assessing non-economic losses 
B. Environmental impact assessment 
1. Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is generally defined as the systematic 
assessment of environmental impacts of any development action in advance of it being 
taken. EIA was first legislated in the United States of America in 1969 as a requirement to 
accompany proposals for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment”1 and has subsequently been rolled out in well over 100 countries, 
including many developing countries, as well as international organizations. Thus there is a 
great deal of experience with EIA and that is one reason why it is valuable to think about 
its relevance to the issues related to assessing non-economic losses. 
2. EIA has several key features relevant to our discussion: 
(a) It is predictive, in that it is intended to inform policymakers on the impacts 
of development ex ante; 
(b) It requires the assessment of the effects of development to be done in an 
integrated, holistic and multi-disciplinary way, in principle bringing together and giving 
parity of esteem to economic, social and environmental effects, both quantitative and 
qualitative; 
(c) Nevertheless, its origins are in environmental legislation and it has often 
been regarded as strongest on environmental effects, alongside economic effects that are 
often easy to quantify and prominent in the context of development (e.g. jobs created) 
and weakest on social effects; 
(d) In some countries there are separate arrangements for socioeconomic or 
social impact assessment, which focus on social and/or economic effects of development, 
whereas in others they are in principle integrated with EIA. There are, in some places, 
even more specific applications or proposed applications, such as the health impact 
assessment and the environmental justice impact assessment; 
(e) Not owing to the original United States legislation or any general 
definition/understanding of the concept of EIA, EIA has come to be applied almost 
exclusively to geographically specific developments and projects such as major 
infrastructure works (as opposed to, for example, national policies). Therefore, the 
methods of impact prediction and valuation that have been developed are appropriate to 
this high degree of spatial resolution. In particular, it is common to see some form of 
quantitative impact prediction of environmental effects such as air and water pollution; 
(f) On the other hand, in part because of its broad scope in terms of 
environmental, social and economic effects and, moreover, because of the need to apply 
it routinely in a local context, at the (e)valuation stage EIA is normally less quantitative and 
technical than some other assessment frameworks, such as CBA. 
3. Figure 12 offers a schematic representation of the EIA process and singles out the 
steps of most relevance to this technical paper (circled by the dashed line). The prediction 
of impacts “aims to identify the magnitude and other dimensions of identified change in 
the environment with a project/action, by comparison with a situation without that 
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project/action” (Glasson, Therivel and Chadwick, 2005, page 5), while the evaluation and 
assessment of significance “assesses the relative significance of the predicted impacts to 
allow a focus on the main adverse impacts” (Glasson, Therivel and Chadwick, op. cit.). 
Note that “mitigating measures” in figure 12 should be understood to mean adaptation to 
climate change in the context of this technical paper. 
Figure 12 
The environmental impact assessment process 
 
Note: The most relevant step of environmental impact assessment for this technical paper is highlighted by the 
dashed line. 
Source: Glasson et al. (2005).  
C. Strategic environmental assessment 
4. Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) has many similarities with EIA. The steps 
of the process are broadly the same as in figure 12, for example. The main difference is 
that it has been designed to remedy the failure of most countries to apply EIA to higher-
level development decisions made by governments in the form of new or amended 
policies, plans and programmes. Thus it has been defined as “a systematic process for 
Project screening (is an EIA needed?)
Scoping (which impacts and issues should be considered?)
Description of the project/development action and alternatives
Description of the environmental baseline
Identification of key impacts
Prediction of impacts
Evaluation and assessment of significance of impacts
Identification of mitigating measures
Presentation of findings in the EIA (including a non-technical 
summary)
Review of the EIA
Decision-making
Post-decision monitoring
Audit of predictions and mitigation measures
Public consultation 
and participation
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evaluating the environmental consequences of proposed policy, plan or programme 
initiatives in order to ensure they are fully included and appropriately addressed at the 
earliest appropriate stage of decision-making on par with economic and social 
considerations” (Sadler and Verheem, 1996). SEA is newer and less widespread than EIA,2 
but, nonetheless, several dozen countries have now legislated for it. 
5. SEA has several key features relevant to our discussion, as distinct from those of 
EIA: 
(a) With a focus on strategic actions that are usually larger in scope than the 
focused projects covered by EIA (e.g. greater geographical reach), SEA must concern itself 
much more with the indirect, cumulative and synergistic effects of development, including 
interactions between strategic actions in different domains. Given the greater scope of 
strategic actions, impact prediction techniques in SEA tend to be more informal and 
qualitative than in EIA, where they are based on expert judgement. As with EIA, 
(e)valuation tends to be informal and qualitative; 
(b) The nature of policymaking in particular means that SEA is applied earlier in 
the decision-making process than EIA, which is typically triggered by a specific 
development proposal. Consequently effective SEA needs to be optimally integrated into 
the existing policymaking process, although that can mean different things in different 
places; 
(c) There can in some cases be separate arrangements for the assessment of 
economic and social impacts of strategic actions. 
D. Environmental risk assessment 
6. While uncertainty is a pervasive feature of EIA, SEA and other assessment 
frameworks, environmental risk assessment (ERA), often simply referred to as risk 
assessment, has developed as a distinct and relatively narrow field. Its origins are in the 
assessment of occupational and consumer risk from chemicals and in nuclear and major 
hazard assessments, both of which have been carried out for many decades. The focus on 
human health and hazardous products and activities is evident in a well-known definition 
of ERA by the United States National Research Council (1983) as “the characterization of 
the potential adverse health effects of human exposures to environmental hazards”. 
Nowadays many countries are applying ERA legislation and guidelines to very specific sets 
of hazards. 
7. There are many similarities between the steps of the ERA process and the steps of 
the EIA/SEA processes detailed above. Figure 13 sets this out in a diagram. Nonetheless, 
ERA, which draws on expert, technical input, focuses more strongly on quantitative 
estimation of the likelihood of a hazard and its consequence. Therefore, the key features 
of ERA for our discussion are: 
(a) The focus on uncertainty, as opposed to best estimates (which has certainly 
been a feature of EIA), and the formal quantification of that uncertainty; 
(b) On the other hand, it has more recently come to be understood that it is 
desirable to nest formal risk assessment within a broader risk management process that 
admits other considerations, such as social attitudes towards risks, which may be quite 
different from the technical valuation of those risks;  
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 The European Union, for example, first passed an SEA directive in 2004. It passed its original EIA 
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(c) A number of scholars have remarked on the potential for cross-fertilization 
between EIA and ERA based on the fact that, by and large, one is strong in areas where 
the other is weak. 
Figure 13 
Stages of risk assessment compared with environmental impact assessment/ strategic environmental 
assessment (‘environmental assessment’) 
 
Source: Adapted from Eduljee (1999). 
E. Cost–benefit analysis and economic valuation 
8. CBA is the principal tool of economic appraisal of the effects of development 
actions, usually of a contained nature although CBA-style analysis has also been used to 
study systemic change. As its name suggests, it is a comparison of the social costs and 
benefits of a development action, in money units, where costs/benefits comprise all the 
negative/positive effects of the action on social welfare. If the social benefits of a 
development action exceed the costs, discounted appropriately to reflect their 
distribution over time and the preference for benefits earlier in time, then the action has 
positive net present value and it is assumed to increase social welfare as conceived by 
economists. Therefore, from an economic perspective, it should go ahead. 
9. The key features of CBA for our discussion are: 
(a) In order to be comparable, all costs and benefits must be monetized in CBA. 
Since market prices are usually only available for a subset of such effects, e.g. changes in 
the production of goods such as agricultural crops and timber, a significant amount of 
non-market valuation is required in order to ensure that the CBA is comprehensive. Hence 
non-market valuation is central to capturing the non-economic effects of development 
actions in CBA; 
(b) CBA is both an assessment framework in its own right and a method/tool 
that can be used with other frameworks. In a small number of countries, there is a 
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legislative requirement to undertake CBA of certain categories of government decisions 
such as new policies at the federal/national level (e.g. in the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States). Therefore, such legislation dictates 
both that assessment is required and which tool should be used. But, on the other hand, 
there is in principle no reason why CBA could not be used as an impact estimation and 
valuation tool within other assessment frameworks, such as EIA and SEA. That this is not 
the case in practice is due to many reasons, prominent among which are an institutional 
culture/preference for non-economic methods and the very significant cost in terms of 
resources, time and expertise required to do CBA well; 
(c) Despite the resource-intensive and expertise-intensive nature of CBA, and 
while it is by no means as prevalent in developing countries as it is in developed countries, 
“the use of cost–benefit analysis as an aid to environmental decision-making has 
expanded in recent years in countries throughout Latin America, Asia, and Africa” 
(Livermore and Revesz, 2013). 
F. Wealth/capital accounting 
10. There is an increasing focus in many countries on expanded notions of national 
wealth and national accounts, which does not just include narrow measures of economic 
output, savings and wealth, but also non-economic savings and sources of wealth, such as 
natural assets. The World Bank has been a prominent advocate of the approach and 
measures comprehensive wealth and adjusted net savings for many countries, while the 
UN System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) contains internationally agreed 
standards for keeping accounts of natural resources, including, but not limited to, 
monetary accounting of natural resources. 
G. Vulnerability assessment 
11. The past decade has seen a growing interest in vulnerability assessment from 
several quarters, including organizations involved in disaster risk reduction (such as 
multilateral development agencies like the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction and national aid agencies), and in analysing the impacts of global 
environmental change (including of course climate change). Vulnerability is the sort of 
broad term that is susceptible to many different theories and interpretations. For 
example, in his 2006 review, Birkmann counts 25 different concepts, definitions and 
methods and 20 different manuals and guidebooks for its estimation. There is every 
chance these counts have subsequently risen. The issue has also been discussed at length 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report, chapter 19, Parry et al., 2007). Nonetheless, vulnerability is 
commonly understood to be a function of the following (see Füssel, 2007, and Füssel and 
Klein, 2006): 
(a) Exposure; 
(b) Sensitivity; 
(c) Adaptive capacity. 
12. This conceptual framework unites various intellectual traditions because it brings 
together considerations of the features of the natural hazard, on the one hand, and the 
social and economic determinants of the vulnerability of affected people and societies, on 
the other. Within (c) a distinction is sometimes further drawn between short-term coping 
and long-term adaptation. 
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13. Assessing vulnerability would seem to necessarily involve some form of 
measurement, and, in turn, measurement involves the use of one or more  
indicators/criteria. But because there are many different theories of vulnerability, and 
because going from theory to measurement brings added difficulties with it, many 
measures and systems of measures have been propose involving different choices on 
dimensions such as the degree of quantification, complexity, whether to focus on single or 
multiple hazards, spatial scale, prominence given to local people and local knowledge, etc. 
Moreover, many of these measures have developed within separate traditions, with 
limited cross-fertilization (Romieu et al., 2010). Some are close to ERA, with the hazard in 
question being natural rather than industrial, while others are at the opposite end of the 
spectrum in terms of technical input. 
14. Consequently it is inappropriate to attempt to characterize this broad field with a 
single idealized model. Instead, examples of the diversity of vulnerability assessment 
methods include: 
(a) Global indices such as the Disaster Risk Index of the United Nations 
Development Programme, a univariate indicator that is constructed by dividing the 
number of people killed by a natural disaster by the number of people exposed, and the 
WorldRiskIndex of the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human 
Security, which is a composite of measures of exposure, susceptibility, coping and 
adaptive capacities (see box 7); 
(b) Catastrophe modelling using for example the CATSIM model of International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, a process-based computer simulation model linking 
weather disasters with economic outcomes; 
(c) Measures of sectoral vulnerability; 
(d) Community-based disaster risk indices and community-based self-
assessment. 
H. Disaster loss assessment 
15. Closely related to vulnerability assessment is the narrower task of disaster 
loss/damage assessment. This takes place after a natural disaster and is intended to reveal 
the extent of losses, such as fatalities and economic losses, including insured and 
uninsured losses. In analysing economic losses, disaster loss/damage assessment 
potentially faces the same sorts of questions that concern ex ante CBA, such as how to 
include non-market effects, but in practice the scope of disaster loss/damage assessment 
has tended to focus more narrowly on market effects, even just insured losses. Damage 
assessment is often conducted as a rapid survey to inform responses such as humanitarian 
aid. 
I. Climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability assessment  
16. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of the specific application of appraisal 
and assessment techniques to climate change impacts and adaptation planning at multiple 
scales from the global to the local. Many of the examples of this are synthesized by 
Working Group II of the IPCC (e.g. in the Fourth Assessment Report). Like vulnerability 
assessment, there is a diversity of approaches within CCIAV, the three main types being: 
(a) Impact-based approaches, which evaluate the expected impacts of climate 
change and then identify adaptation options to reduce any resulting vulnerability; 
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(b) Adaptation-based and vulnerability-based approaches, which identify 
processes affecting vulnerability and adaptive capacity, normally independent of any 
specific future climate forecast. Therefore, such approaches can be understood as a 
specific application of vulnerability assessment as described above; 
(c) Risk-management approaches, which focus directly on decision-making and 
offer a framework for incorporating all approaches as well as confronting uncertainty. 
17. The impacts-based approach is a so-called ‘science-first’ or top-down framework, in 
that it takes a linear approach of from prediction to action. It begins by producing 
projections of changes in emissions and ends by exploring the economic and non-
economic effects of a range of adaptation options. The use of integrated assessment 
models for CCIAV is therefore an example of such an approach. 
18. Conversely, the adaptation-based, vulnerability-based and risk-management 
approaches are examples of ‘policy-first’ or bottom-up frameworks. A policy-first 
framework typically begins at the scale of the adaptation problem, specifying objectives 
and constraints, identifying viable adaptation strategies and only then assessing the 
desirability of these against a set of objectives and future projections. 
19. While the conceptual differences between the approaches may not be so large, in 
practice it has been argued that policy-first approaches require much less information 
about the predicted impacts of climate change. In the end, some of this information turns 
out not to be of great significance for the vulnerability of the area under study (Ranger et 
al., 2010). 
    
